THE IMPACT OF
GLOBALISATION ON THE AGRICULTURAL SECTORS OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES
P. Robbins – CMIS
R. S. B Ferris – IITA - FOODNET
March 2002
Contents
Agricultural
development strategies
GLOBALISATION The Process of Market Integration
THE
IMPACT OF LIBERALISATION ON AFRICAN AGRICULTURE
Farm-gate
prices and liberalisation
Farm-size the case for a mix of
commercial and small holder farms
Agricultural
Marketing infrastructure
Other
aspects of the impact of liberalisation
Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures
The
SPS Agreement and ECA countries
Links
between the liberalisation process and the ‘Adding-up Problem’
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS
The
WTO Agreement on Agriculture
Comments
on the WTO Agreement on Agriculture
Making
Cotonou compatible with WTO rules
Comments
on the Cotonou Agreement
EU
‘Everything but Arms’ measure
Other
measures to increase market access for Least Developed Countries
US
African Growth and Opportunity Act
The
capacity of ECA countries to negotiate trade agreements
The
various forms of market activity
The
international dimension of the post-adjustment agenda
Preparation
for the WTO Ministerial meeting in Doha
Sanitary
and phytosanitary measures (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT)
Capacity-building
and Technical assistance
The
WTO Ministerial meeting in Doha – November 2001
Domestic
dimensions of the Post-adjustment agenda
Encouraging
collective farming activities
The
role of agricultural research and development programmes
Managing
markets and the end of globalisation
Another
analysis of globalisation
PRIORITY
ISSUES FOR GOVERNMENT AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES
PROFILES
OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
Similarities
and differences in ECA countries
ANNEX
I The Globalisation Debate
Globalisation
especially hurts the poor.
The
fallacy of composition locks in poverty.
Globalisation
supports agricultural trade for the rich at the expense of the poor
Globalisation
supports militarism over civil society.
Globalisation
is undemocratic.
Globalisation
is neutering politics.
The
Washington Consensus is a conspiracy
ANNEX
III a new initiative
for supply management of primary commodities
ANNEX
IV. Strategies for economic and
agricultural development policy
ANNEX
V Table 1 Economic indicators
ANNEX
V Table 2 Total Agricultural Productions in 2000
ANNEX V Table
3.Demographic trends for the 10 countries of the ECA sub-region
ANNEX
V Table 4: Basic
Agricultural Statistics for the countries of the ECA sub-region
ANNEX
VI PRODUCTION STATISTICS (FAO)
ANNEX
VI PRODUCTION STATISTICS (FAO) cont..
Globalisation is the term used to describe the recent impact of innovations in communications and transport systems on trade and the growing interdependence of countries due to economic sophistication and burgeoning output. These innovations have encouraged nations to reduce the high levels of protection between trading blocks of countries and to adopt policies to liberalise their economies in order to increase their volume of trade, including trade in agricultural products.
It has been proved that, for many countries, increased economic liberalisation and openness leads to growth. It has also been recognised, however, that for some countries and for some communities within countries the transition from a protected, centrally controlled economy may bring with it serious, negative, short and medium term consequences.
Some Eastern and Central African countries have recognised the importance of striving to increase their role in the international economy and have, over the last two decades, adopted appropriate economic measures – others have done so more recently. These measures have resulted in benefits to ECA countries including the stimulation of private sector trading networks needed in a modern economy. However, the risks associated with adopting a more exposed position in a highly competitive global agricultural market have presented these countries with some serious difficulties. A combination of the impact of structural adjustment programmes and partial reform of the rules governing international trade has reduced the prices of primary commodities exported by ECA countries and caused an increase in imports of agricultural products from more competitive producers, some of which remain highly subsidised in their country of origin.
The result of oversupply and weakening demand due to the current recession, has led to commodity prices falling to a 40 year low and analysts suggest that commodity prices are likely to remain at these low levels for the foreseeable future. This bleak outlook is reflected in the dramatically falling terms of trade for many ECA countries and suggests a profound downturn in their economic outlook and performance. The international community has recognised some of these difficulties and has made some effort to assist these countries to overcome them. Much remains to be done by these countries themselves, however, to take advantage of the opportunities offered by globalisation and to ameliorate the negative impacts of the process.
In the next round of WTO talks, the radical reform of the trading relationship between ACP countries and the EU and the establishment of closer regional economic co-operation will have further major implications for agriculture.
In the opinion of the authors of this paper, ECA countries have not appreciated the scale and implications of these changes and that, without urgent action on their part, they may seriously weaken their economies in the years ahead. Measures need to be adopted by a very wide range of agencies in both the public and private sectors. These range from a major effort to increase the understanding of issues in multilateral trade negotiations, urgent efforts to devise strategies to reduce economic dependence on primary commodities and major reforms of agricultural development and research strategies.
This paper attempts to set these issues in an historical context, to highlight the main issues that need to be addressed and to list important questions that need to be asked of policy-makers throughout the agricultural industry. The conclusions of this study are that decision-makers should give urgent consideration to the following suggestions:-
1.
Strengthening negotiating capacity in trade talks
African countries have been disappointed by the effects of decisions made in previous WTO and ACP-EU negotiations. ECA countries are poorly represented in these and other multilateral and bilateral talks and they lack of capacity to analyse important and highly complex issues, to develop negotiating positions and to respond quickly and effectively to their various negotiating teams. Consideration should be given to establishing national and regional teams of experts with the necessary authority to analyse the interests of their stakeholder groups and to establish appropriate negotiating positions. Negotiating teams should be significantly strengthened in Brussels and Geneva especially. Resources should be made available by cutting diplomatic expenditure in other countries where necessary. The negotiators need to be directly linked the policy analysis groups and to the line Ministries of Trade, Agriculture and Finance, such that informed decisions can be made rapidly and effectively. Such reform will be particularly necessary in the forthcoming WTO trade round which will focus on greater inclusion of developing country interests and may take into account proposals associated with “Development Box” (see page 51) and other non-trade issues proposed by developing countries.
2.
Managing the over-supply of primary product exports
Over the last two decades the adoption of internal and international
market liberalisation polices have led to a catastrophic fall in the prices of
many of the agricultural products exported by ECA countries. The plunge in
prices has been caused by systemic over-production stimulated by components of
structural adjustment programmes. Economist’s call this phenomenon, the fallacy
of composition i.e., less income is earned as more commodities are
produced. ECA countries are highly dependent on the production of cash-crop
commodities for employment, economic growth and export revenue.
Countries that produce and export raw commodities such as coffee,
sugar, tea, cotton etc. through small-scale production systems are unable to
create new jobs or re-invest into alternative market sectors. Countries and
individual farmers, who rely on cash crop production for revenue, are obliged
to continue to grow and sell these commodities, no matter how low prices fall.
To address this issue, efforts should be made to find common cause with
other producers of these commodities in Africa and in other continents to bring
some order into these markets and to devise strategies that involve, donors and
support agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank to bring supply of these
products in line with demand.
3. Enforcing
existing trade protection
ECA WTO members have agreed to limit the protection given to domestic
farming. Fixed import tariffs still apply in many categories, however. Greater
efforts should be made to increase control of porous borders to discourage
unwanted imports and to collect excise revenue. The dumping of heavily subsidised
agricultural commodities from developed countries should be actively opposed
where such imports disrupt local farming economies. These efforts need to be
pursued within the WTO mechanism and in bilateral exchanges.
Efforts should also be made to analyse the impact of imports of food
aid and food monetisation schemes on domestic and regional farming. Such
imports should be controlled with the objective of meeting relief needs whilst
avoiding the undermining of local and regional production.
4. Stimulating
production of added-value products
Most analysts believe that the prices of primary agricultural
commodities will continue to fall in the foreseeable future. Unless the mix of
industrial activity is changed, economic growth will not occur.
The “Everything But Arms’ initiative”, the “Africa Growth Opportunity
Act” and other similar market-access measures now offer LDC countries in ECA
the opportunity to attract investment into the region to improve the quality
and range of products and, more importantly, to produce added-value products
made from locally produced raw materials. Every effort should be made to
capitalise on these opportunities by promoting inward investment now that many
tariff barriers to added-value products have been removed in the main consuming
markets. [Kenya should seriously consider applying to be re-classified as a
Least Developed Country for this reason.]
Consideration should be given to strengthening the role of existing
export and investment promotion organisations to include the preparation of
detailed investment plans and packages in added-value products that will
attract greater foreign direct investment (FDI). Tax regimes should be modified
where necessary to encourage this form of investment. Vertical diversification
may represent the only option for ECA countries to avoid the economic damage
caused by falling raw commodity prices.
5.
Establishing an Agricultural Market Analysis Unit
An Agricultural Market Analysis Unit should be established in each ECA
country. This unit would be concerned with co-ordinating and developing policy
on the development of market-orientated strategy in agriculture and setting
policy guidelines for agricultural research. The Unit should also co-ordinate
its activities with relevant regional bodies. It should be staffed with
appropriately qualified economists and market experts. The Unit should work
closely with the private sector and, especially, with those private-sector
support groups working to stimulate production for growth markets.
6.
Establishing a National Market Education Programme
Many actors in the agricultural sectors in ECA countries are still not
familiar with the idea of competitive markets. A National Market Education
Programme should be established targeted, primarily, at farmers, traders and
agricultural product processors. Such a programme needs to be linked to the
Agricultural Market Analysis Unit (see above). Market Information Services (see
below) and run in conjunction with other stakeholders including Ministries of Agriculture,
Education and Trade, farmers’ and traders’ associations and other private
sector actors and with extension services.
The programme needs to set targets for training farmers to understand
how competitive markets work, to take advantage of market information and to
inform them of the difficulties and opportunities associated with market
conditions. Issues addressed need to include the stimulation of collective
activity to improve economies of scale, linking supply variety and quality to
market needs, negotiation of sales and inputs and the use of credit and
business management.
The programme should have a limited duration and should be administered
efficiently as a separate unit within a national agricultural development
reform programme.
7. Establishing
a Market Information Service
Many typical, small and medium-scale farmers, traders and processors in
ECA countries are very poorly informed about prices and market conditions of
the commodities they produce. Farmers find themselves in a weak bargaining
position with traders which results in lower-than-market farm-gate prices, high
transaction costs and wastage. Market Information Services need to be
established at local, national and regional level to gather, process and
disseminate market information in the appropriate language of intended
recipients. Such services need to be fully co-ordinated with each other and
involve full participation of stakeholders.
The aim of these services should be to stimulate more competitive
markets. They are likely to be supported by the agricultural industry itself as
they are in more developed countries, once competitive markets become more
established.
8.
Strengthening agricultural research and extension and services
Research and extension services need to continue with their vital role
in controlling plant and animal disease and pests, discovering and distributing
new varieties, training farmers to improve their technical abilities, etc. etc.
If ECA countries wish to compete successfully in the world economy, however,
these institutions need to develop or acquire new skills and expertise in
market analysis and market linkage. Producers need to ensure that there are
viable markets for any existing or new products. They need to ensure that the
quality and packaging of those products meet the requirements of customers both
on the domestic and export market. Research and extension services have a vital
role to play in this effort and must be prepared to reform quickly to meet the
challenges of globalisation.
In many respects national research programmes have succeeded in their
goal to achieve food security, the current emphasis should now be to develop
dynamic and commercially orientated research that supports improved market
analysis, market access and added value processing. Extension services should
now focus on assisting producers to trade more effectively within a liberalised
market. Special attention should be given to aspects such as linkage of
production to markets, access to credit and collective marketing which will
enable the millions of atomised, small-scale farmers to gain from economies of
scale in their input and output markets.
Government research services need to work closely with the private
sector which is increasingly developing its’ own research capacity,
particularly in regard to higher value commodities and research related to
issues and problems further up the value chain.
9. Reducing
imports of goods that can be competitively produced domestically
Many ECA countries import fruit juices, soluble coffee, cooking oils,
etc. when they are rich in all the raw materials needed to make these products
and have low labour costs. An effort should be made to examine import data and
to analyse the prospects for developing the local manufacture of such products
and to encourage investment in the production of such goods but only if this
can be done profitably without resort to market protection. It should be
remembered that savings on imports are as valuable as export revenue.
10.
Strengthening the legal framework for market activity
Market manipulation and collusion among traders to the detriment of
farmers, consumers and exporters are widespread practices in ECA countries. In
some countries, road tolls and taxes are arbitrarily applied and often restrict
trade and increase transaction costs. Where necessary, governments must
institute a programme to reform the legal framework within which agricultural
product transactions take place, establish or reform laws of contract, outlaw
restrictive practices and regulate a competitive market in agricultural goods.
In addition, governments must ensure that these laws are properly enforced.
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ON THE AGRICULTURAL
SECTORS OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES
The purpose of this report is to assist policy-makers in government agencies, agricultural research and agricultural development agencies by offering an analysis of the impact of globalisation on the agricultural sectors of East and Central African (ECA) countries. (Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.)
This report records the findings of an IITA study conducted between September and December 2001. The research for the study was based on a review of relevant literature and interviews with agricultural trade agreement negotiators.
This report will be used as a basis for discussions with government agencies and Directors of Agricultural Research Establishments in the ASARECA region. Responses will be added to an extended report in 2002.
East and Central African (ECA) countries, are dependent on agriculture in many ways. The majority of the population of these countries are employed in the agricultural sector. Agricultural commodities represent by far the largest proportion of exported goods and the main raw materials for manufactured products. More importantly, the people of these countries depend on the agricultural sector for food. Agricultural development is the key to poverty reduction and food security.
Agriculture is the engine of most African economies and in recent years
governments have become convinced that, by liberalising their economies,
agriculture would prosper and provide the necessary growth to provide
investment to improve the country’s infrastructure, to form the foundation for
industrialisation and to improve public services. In the 1980s some African
countries began to reform their economic policies. Internal conflict, however,
has delayed reform in many ECA countries and they have only recently begun to
liberalise their internal economies. Over the last twenty years there has also
been an accelerating trend to liberalise trade on a global scale.
The success of these global reforms and internal liberalisation measures (for those countries that have adopted them) has been patchy. Most African countries have found it difficult to compete with more efficient foreign agricultural producers and are suffering surges in imported products which compete with domestic production. At the same time, the expected improvement in exports of these products has not materialised. This may be due, in part, to the difficulties of complying with the high quality standards required by many importing countries. The international market prices of almost all agricultural commodities have fallen to their lowest levels (in real terms) in living memory. This is due to over-production encouraged by the export-orientated economic policies of competing producing countries. The cut in agricultural subsidies in the developed world has reduced surplus stocks of food which has had the effect of reducing supplies available for food aid.
It has now become clear that although a link between economic growth and the liberalisation of the economy has been established for some types of economy, it has not been established for others.
In
a World Bank-commissioned paper, O.Baniane and N. Mukherjee of the
International Food Policy Research Institute made the following observation.
The growing (and seemingly established)
consensus among development economists and policy-makers is that
outward-orientated developing countries grow more rapidly than those that are
not. While the precise role of exports in improved total growth is not yet
fully understood, mounting evidence suggests that there exists a strong
positive association between export development and the acceleration of income
growth. It should be noted, however, that the literature establishes a
relationship between exports of manufactured goods and income growth, but is
less assertive about the relationship between exports of agricultural goods.
Just
as liberalisation affects different countries in different ways, it has also
produced winners and losers in different parts of the agricultural sectors
within individual countries.
The
lowering of tariff barriers by consuming countries has offered more
opportunities to exporters in developing countries. The exposure of
agricultural production to foreign competition has forced some producers to
become more efficient. The dismantling of government-controlled marketing
boards has stimulated the evolution of the private sector trading networks
needed in a modern economy. Some actors in the agricultural sector have seen
little benefit from the liberalisation process, however.
Communities of small-scale, isolated farmers (which make up the majority of the population in many ECA countries) find it more difficult to obtain inputs and credit. Extension services have been significantly reduced and the value of their surplus production has fallen. They are especially vulnerable to changes in production systems. The trend towards larger farms and plantations in the name of efficiency has marginalised many rural groups thus adding to the problem of unemployment, urbanisation and cultural disintegration.
The effort required to address these problems and challenges will have to be made by many agencies. Trade agreement negotiators, government agencies, agricultural development and agricultural research organisations, NGOs and private-sector farmers’, traders’ and processors associations all need to be fully aware of the changing relationships between markets and all the different actors in agriculture, and shape their policies and programmes accordingly.
This report examines the main benefits and disadvantages of the trend towards globalisation and the liberalisation of agricultural markets. It also attempts to offer some suggestions on how ECA countries might maximise the opportunities offered by a more open global trading system and how they might respond to some of the negative aspects of liberalisation. In particular, the report will highlight key issues that need to be addressed by all agencies involved in agricultural development in an increasingly globalised economic environment.
East Africa has a tradition of trade, especially with the Arabian peninsular and Southern Asia, going back several thousand years. Arab merchants developed trading links with many African kingdoms and established settlements on the coast before the 8th century AD. Trade routes were established into the interior of the continent to transport commodities such as ivory, gold, furs, gums and slaves, to the coast and Asian food products such as bananas and coconuts as well as some spices were introduced.
European colonisation began in the 15th Century. The Portuguese charted the coastline and developed natural harbours for use in their trade with the East and they too began trading in African goods. The Portuguese were followed by the French and British and later by the Germans and Italians. Each colonial power began to explore further into the interior and to subdue the indigenous populations. The British, especially, recognised the potential for agriculture in the region and established plantations and farms. Large areas were colonised and territorial borders delineated. Cotton was produced as well as food crops and livestock. Local African agriculture was transformed with the introduction of crops from other parts of the world, notably those originating in the Americas such as sweet potatoes, potatoes, maize, cassava, peppers, tomatoes, papaya, jackfruit, cocoa, passion fruit, pineapple, sisal, cashew nuts, sunflower, groundnuts and tobacco.
In the late 19th century the first railways were driven deep into central Africa. In certain instances workers were transported to Africa, especially from the Indian sub-continent, to work in the plantations and as labourers to build roads and railways. Indians with an entrepreneurial background were able to establish businesses that grew to represent a significant proportion of trading activity in some countries.
Europe’s main commercial interest in ECA was its raw materials – minerals and agricultural products. The present transport system reflects those interests. Railways and major roads were designed to carry products from the interior to the coast, not to encourage or facilitate trade within the region. Borders between countries are largely arbitrary, from an African point of view, and they often cut across the territory of populations with a common language and culture.
European companies dominated import/export trade in African products often holding a monopoly in specific commodities. Many of these companies not only organised the production of these commodities but also transported them and processed them locally or, more often, in their home country. Some, like the giant chocolate, tea, sugar, tobacco and coffee companies, also marketed the finished product. In order to protect these monopolies trade barriers had to be erected between African countries colonised by different colonial powers. At times, countries of the region were officially at war with each other as the French fought the English, the English fought the Germans, and so on. Such an environment, of course, discouraged the evolution of trading links within the region.
As urban populations grew and the number of plantation workers increased, the Europeans found it necessary to organise the distribution of food through governmental structures and to control both purchasing and retail prices.
The process of de-colonialisation began after World War II and most African countries gained their independence in the 1950’s and 1960s. African governments generally retained the marketing structures and trade barriers bequeathed to them by the colonial regime but they benefited from the relatively high commodity prices at the time. In the 1970s and early 80s some commodities, such as coffee, cocoa, sugar and rubber, were the subject of International Commodity Agreements which maintained prices at a level agreed by producing and consuming countries. Some African countries experimented with collectivised production as a means of improving the economies of scale and others concentrated on self-sufficiency and import substitution. Many large commercial farms and plantations were retained and expanded.
In the post World War II period, European countries embarked on programmes to develop their own agricultural sectors, partly in response to their experiences in the war, when large quantities of food had to be imported by sea at great cost both in money and lives. All developed countries were able to boost agricultural output through innovations in farming technology – machinery, artificial fertilisers, pesticides and new multiplication techniques. Farms too became bigger and more efficiently managed. During this period, developed countries also enjoyed unprecedented rates of industrial and economic growth. Trade in manufactured goods and services increased enormously. Transport systems improved by air, sea and land and communications systems were developed to facilitate trade. Trade in raw materials and agricultural products has become a relatively minor component of international commerce. Farming now represents only about two percent of total economic output in the most highly developed countries.
Traditional African farming methods do not lend themselves so easily to efficient, large-scale production.
Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda have all suffered multiple problems from war or internal conflict. Their economies have been severely damaged by military expenditure, degradation of infrastructure, dislocation of populations, loss of labour to military activities and neglect of, and damage to, farms and factories. Millions of ECA citizens have lost their lives over the last thirty years. Apart from the devastation of war itself, the disruption caused by conflict has delayed the implementation of economic reforms and development programmes and many of these countries have lost their access to aid programmes and investment opportunities.
The reasons for conflict have included tribal animosity, territorial disputes, remnants of Cold War conflict, totalitarianism and religious intolerance. Some analysts have identified a link between conflict and poverty in which it is difficult to break the cycle of poverty leading to unrest and unrest exacerbating poverty. At the end of 2001, however, there seem to be some grounds for optimism. Most major conflicts in the region have been resolved or, at least reduced to a lower level of intensity.
The lack of development in African countries has caused their economies to fall further and further behind those of the leading industrial nations. Many different development strategies have been tried. Some African countries have successfully encouraged investment in mining, tourism and industry. In agriculture, producers have been encouraged to move away from subsistence farming towards a more commercial approach as governments realised that income generated from the sale of surplus production could be used to improve productivity.
Agricultural development in ECA has faced an uphill struggle for the last twenty years. In an effort to stimulate development many countries borrowed heavily from bodies such as the IMF and from the commercial banking sector. These loans were not granted without strings attached, however. Most African countries were obliged to liberalise their economies by adopting significant policy changes often applied in packages known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). These programmes included a number of elements but generally included requirement to:
· devalue the currency (to discourage imports and make exports more competitive),
· to make the currency freely convertible with other currencies,
· to cut public expenditure (in order to lower taxes),
· to dismantle state controlled marketing boards,
· to privatise state-owned industries (to raise capital and stimulate competition),
· to cut import restrictions (to encourage local industries to become more efficient),
· to allow foreign companies to freely repatriate profits (to encourage inward investment),
· and to boost exports.
The economists who designed SAPs were convinced that the only way African countries could transform their economies was to encourage inward investment and earn foreign exchange to invest in infrastructure and lay the foundations for industrialisation.
These measures assumed that any country could compete in the world market if production and investment was concentrated in areas where they were deemed to have a competitive advantage. The only activity in which ECA nations could be said to have a competitive advantage in the world market was in the production of agricultural products and the exploitation of natural resources such as forestry, fishing and mining. The major flaw in this strategy was that similar advice was given to almost all tropical countries at the same time. Coffee-producing countries were encouraged to boost coffee production; sugar producers should produce more sugar, and so on. This resulted in over-production of these commodities which caused prices to plunge in the international markets. On average, current prices of tropical products (taking dollar inflation into account) are only about one seventh of those prevailing in 1980 (UN General Assembly). Economists call this phenomenon the fallacy of composition - less income is earned as more commodities are produced.
Another component of SAPs which many observers believe to have been counter-productive was the requirement to cut public expenditure. All too often this meant a cut in health programmes, education and agricultural extension. These measures have tended to reduce, rather than enhance the flexibility of the workforce and to curtail agricultural development.
Overall, the record of inward investment has been poor and the ending of currency controls has increased opportunities for transfer pricing abuse (where companies over-price imports and under-price exports to reduce tax liability).
The most important SAP reform affecting the distribution of agricultural products has been the dismantling of state-controlled marketing boards and the practice of setting fixed purchasing and sales prices for commodities. It was assumed that government control of markets had obscured the forces of competition in supply and demand in the economy. A free market system would unleash these forces and increase productivity. It would force producers to meet the demands of consumers both in price and quality. Farmers would be able to buy inputs cheaper from competing suppliers, and the country, as a whole, would become more competitive in world markets.
Unfortunately, competitive and transparent markets did not emerge spontaneously (Shepherd). Most African farmers have too little land to produce truck-loads of goods and they are widely dispersed over the countryside. There is not enough business to encourage more than one trader to operate in many areas. Farmers have no means of communicating with the outside world or even the nearest town and they are often unwilling to risk the investment of bringing their goods to market resulting in considerable waste. Laws may have been passed which ban collusion among traders to pay low prices to farmers and charge high prices to consumers, but there are often insufficient resources to enforce such laws. Most traders have no experience of free market conditions and are reluctant to put their fellow traders out of business with serious competition.
Advocates of SAPs point to examples of countries that have improved their economies after adopting SAPs (World Bank) but there are few in Africa. Most ECA countries were not able to implement SAPs until relatively recently but rates of poverty have increased in many of these countries. Intense conflict, both within and between countries of the region, drought, desertification and, now HIV/AIDS have further weakened economic development in ECA. Most critics of the reform process, however, acknowledge that markets in African countries must be made more competitive and SAPs are designed to do that but this process may take a considerable time.
Economic links between ECA countries and their former colonial rulers have been maintained since independence. The economies of these countries have been moulded to meet the needs of their European counterpart for a hundred years or more and it would have been difficult for them to make the necessary changes in production patterns to trade successfully with other countries. The Europeans too needed to maintain supplies of raw materials and export markets in Africa and to protect the business of their trading companies. In 1975 all ten countries covered by this study became party to the Lomé Convention. The Convention established trade, aid and cultural relationships between 15 European countries and 71 so called ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries which had either been colonies of, or had had strong historical links with, Europe. This agreement did not rule out bilateral or multilateral agreements with other countries but did give ACP countries preferential access to European markets. ECA countries have also decided to try to stimulate regional trade by bringing their economies closer together in regional economic agreements such as COMESA and SADC.
East Africans have exchanged goods and ideas with many other peoples of the world for millennia. In these exchanges of goods, cultural links have been established which have influenced ECA life at all levels – in religion, the arts, public sector structures, the economy and agriculture. In the last decade or two, however, this process has accelerated tremendously.
There is no agreed definition of globalisation. It is simply a term which has been used recently to describe the impact of innovations in communication and transport systems on trade and the growing interdependence of nations due to economic sophistication and burgeoning output. In addition, high levels of protection between trading blocks of countries are breaking down as barriers to trade are reduced. These changes have made it possible to increase the volume of trade between countries in agricultural products.
It became clear that overall levels of trade could be increased if trade barriers were reduced, where there was agreement to do so, and that international trade should be governed by mutually agreed rules. The most active trading nations have been keen to find new markets for their goods and to reduce the barriers to free trade. These countries, however, have been reluctant to expose their own markets to foreign competition, especially unfair competition from subsidised or sub-standard goods.
At
the international level, global liberalisation was stimulated by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which was first implemented in 1948 as a
mechanism to promote free and fair trade among member countries. Several rounds
of negotiations of trade rules have occurred throughout the history of GATT.
The Uruguay Round, which began in 1986, was the eighth of the GATT rounds. In
April 1994, officials from more than 100 countries gathered in Marrakech,
Morocco to sign the Uruguay Agreement and to confer the role of further trade
reforms on the newly established World Trade Organisation.
The
reform process is by no means complete. Almost all countries have now committed
themselves to the objectives associated with their membership of the WTO. (6
out of the 10 countries covered in this study are WTO members). In order to
meet these objectives, countries are obliged to further reform their existing
internal economic and external trade policies.
The
future of trade and agriculture in ECA is inextricably linked to the rate and
direction of these reforms.
GLOBALISATION The Process of Market Integration
The process of global integration of markets began in the mid 1800s, with the rise in international trade driven by European colonialism. Market expansion was fuelled by rapidly increasing populations, urbanisation and new overseas markets seeking to trade low cost raw commodities for processed goods. The ability to supply these developing markets with value added products was made possible through new manufacturing processes based on steam, petroleum, and electrical technologies, combined with the increasing ability to communicate with trade partners through improved mail systems and more latterly through mediums such as radio and telephone. These new technologies were further supported with more competitive transportation systems based on a combination of canals, railways and merchant shipping.
This first round of globalisation was an extended period of rapid economic expansion for the colonial powers, a time when nations built empires and families amassed fortunes. The rewards of the system were highly skewed across countries and social classes and despite the overall growth, the social pressures, amongst classes and competing nations, led to a backlash that plunged the world into 70 years of global insecurity. In direct conflict with the capitalist movement came the alternative doctrines of Marxism, communism and fascism. The struggle between these opposing forces was played out in two world wars and the protracted period of the Cold war.
The Cold war, which dominated geo-politics between the 1940s - 1960s, shifted political weight towards military fortification, as the two remaining superpowers the USA and the Soviet Union, fought a shadow war through proxy governments. Throughout the Cold war period, the superpowers, and their allies, provided military and financial support to “friendly” governments to enlarge their “sphere of influence”. Foreign policy maintained support for many corrupt and socially damaging regimes, particularly in developing countries where much of the Cold war was conducted. Support to some unsavoury regimes was justified on the basis that it would prevent the defection of allies and avoid the “domino effect” that would lead to global domination.
In the mid 1980’s the Cold war came to an end with the economic collapse of the Soviet empire, and the emergence of a new capitalist movement under the leadership of Reagan in the United States and Thatcher in the UK. This new political partnership promoted a highly liberalised form of capitalism in which government policy was led by the interests of the corporate private sector. This new regime introduced policies that radically reduced Government intervention in the market place, privatised or excised inefficient state sectors and removed power from labour unions. At the same time many of the trade restrictions between countries were removed through a series of negotiated trade treaties such as GATT, Maastricht and a warming of relations between the Western powers and the Asian countries.
The result of these political changes combined with major advances in technology, communication and transportation spawned this second round of globalisation. The end of the 20th Century saw the advent of the digital age, which led to a paradigm shift in science and business management. The private sector integrated this digital technology into a vast range of new miniaturised products and applications and new market opportunities enabled industrialised nations to make a general shift away from heavy to lighter manufacturing industries. Communications were transformed by satellite and fibre optic systems. The seaports and railways of the 19th century were superseded by airports and more efficient road networks. Improvements in communications gave rise to mass access to information and ongoing liberalised legislation supported the development of new international finance mechanisms that was able to fund a more globally interactive private sector. The additive effect of these factors on trade was recently catalysed with the advent of the Internet which has, once again, dramatically increased our ability to share information, transact business and make decisions on events as they occur around the world.
This latest round of globalisation, which started in the 1960s and gained momentum in the 1980s has led to a period of unprecedented economic growth for the developed nations. Developing countries, particularly those which were able to industrialise and more recently, liberalise their economies, have also experienced a period of sustained growth, which has led to significantly reduced levels of global poverty. The impact of globalisation on the least developed countries (LDCs) has been less impressive.
The framework for growth in this latest round of globalised trade is based on building confidence in the investment sector. In contrast to the Cold war period, when Governments were rewarded by political allegiance to the super powers, success in this new era is based on market competitiveness. Financial support is no longer based on the largesse of Governments, but on the judgement of international finance houses. Investment decisions are made on the ability of companies, countries and Governments to develop a political and social environment which favours private sector enterprise.
The shift in investment power from Governments to the finance sector has largely been achieved with the introduction of new legislation which has liberalised the finance sector, enabling free flow of capital in and out of countries and the development of new mechanisms for fund raising. The power of the finance houses has been tremendously increased through “financial leveraging” mechanisms such as derivatives, hedging funds and junk bonds, which enable brokers to build multi-million dollar loan packages from million dollar investments. The fact that most citizens in western countries are also engaged in personal pension and stock based savings schemes has also provided a new source of capital to investors. Companies and Governments have benefited as they have been able to extend credit, or offload debt onto the public through shares and bonds and this mechanism has considerably increased their ability to raise capital. Whilst, these financial instruments offer new opportunities to access funds, they also incur a more stringent performance mechanism as borrowers are now not simply accountable to the board of a bank, but to many hundreds of thousands of individuals, who now “own” a stake in the company, country or regime.
The result of this liberalisation of finance means that investment agencies are now under the scrutiny of millions of investors, who chart the progress of their savings on the stock markets. Consequently investors need to constantly monitor world markets to identify the most favourable investment opportunities and avoid or offload the poor performers. The internet has enabled many millions of new entrants into the investment decision making process and the result of this increase in market monitoring has been to accelerate the dynamics of the global investment decision making process. Clearly those companies and countries which offer the best returns are rewarded by this profit hungry group.
The habits and responses of this increasing number of market “watchers”, is not always predictable. Decisions on where to invest and when to offload are not always based on sound analysis and the tendency for investors to follow the majority decision has earned this group of investors, the title of the “electronic herd”. Given that the growth of nations is linked to trade through investment, then attracting the “electronic herd” is highly desirable. However, there are risks, as the herd is not loyal and whilst their presence means that funds can be accumulated rapidly, these same funds can also flow out equally rapidly if the herd stampedes.
The “electronic herd”, is complimented if not led by another major group of investors, the multi / trans-nationals, who make major long term commitments / investments to countries, if the conditions for investment are favourable. The types of decisions, made by the multi-nationals, include for example the location of a new car plant, a micro-chip assembly centre or a textiles factory. Attracting this type of investor can have major pay-offs for countries in terms of growth and labour opportunities, but the conditions for such investments are highly competitive and the trans-nationals expect very attractive terms and conditions.
Both types of investors seek locations where entrepreneurs can operate in an unfettered, risk supportive environment, where profits can be maximised. For long term business growth the investment houses are seeking framework conditions that adhere to banking laws, commercial law, contract law, business codes of conduct, independence of the central bank, property rights that encourage the entrepreneur, effective processes of judicial review, international accounting standards, regulatory oversight, laws against conflicts of interest and a system in which officials and citizens are ready to implement these rules in a consistent manner, Friedman, (2000). The economic policies of interest include those which, favour industrialists and reduce power to labour unions, reduce government intervention in the marketplace, provide highly transparent, timely fiscal information, and have regulatory watch dogs that fight corruption and penalise those who are caught. The commercial viability of a country can also be measured by the strength of the banking / business sector in relation to its bond market, stock market and treasury support programmes. In terms of physical infrastructure, investors are attracted to Governments that devolve power to the private sector and support infrastructural programmes that support the business environment, such as upgrading transportation and communications systems, particularly digital services.
As the ability of measuring performance increases, investors have become more sophisticated in their use of social indicators and therefore in addition to monitoring real time rates of financial flows in and out of the country, new social indicators are also being used such as the level of education of the workforce, the degree to which people are able to communicate and with the advent of e-commerce, the latest market indicators are associated with the rates at which consumers become linked to the internet.
Advocates of globalisation argue that all of these socio-economic measures are constructive and that the growth achieved through removing market barriers and integrating trade worldwide is benefiting all players, both rich and poor and that globalisation not only reduces poverty it also strengthens the cause of democracy. It is further argued that globalisation is an impartial decision maker which provides Governments and more importantly, the people who vote in Governments, with the ability to make decisions for their economic growth. The notion that globalisation is a force for the empowerment of people, is termed “globalution” and this concept is based on the premise that if people within a country want reforms for greater economic growth, the people must advocate and vote for policies that support greater market liberalisation and good governance.
To compete in this new economic environment, companies, Governments and countries need to be ever more efficient, ever more responsive to market signals and ever more innovative in order to keep up with the demands and opportunities offered by the market. Clearly, those countries most likely to succeed are those which, have (i) most access to technology, (ii) are the innovators of technology, (iii) have the most highly educated labour force, (iv) have best access to risk capital, (v) are most able to communicate with partners and consumers, (vi) have the legal and regulatory framework to curb system abusers and (vii) can provide a “Net speed” flow of all the required fiscal information to the investors. The best adapted countries to the new environment at present are the industrialised countries, who are unabashedly gaining most from the system. These gains are not marginal, as lead countries take a lions’ share of the profits and leave a diminishing amount for the rest of the players. To put this in perspective, 51 of the world’s largest 100 economies are private sector and 359 corporations account for 40% of the world Trade, (Oberg, 2002).
The risks or negative aspects associated with globalisation are also becoming more apparent and many least developing countries, particularly the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) are suffering declining terms of trade due to their inability to adjust to changing market signals within the liberalised global economy. Unlike industrialised sectors where factories can be closed until supply is more evenly balanced with demand, the economics of primary products produced by poor countries is different. These countries do not have the alternative investment opportunities, or a skilled labour force to develop non-agricultural industries or services. They rely on cash crop production for export revenue no matter how low prices fall. A combination of dept and dependence on raw commodities means that several countries are entering into an accelerating downward spiral, in which production needs to be increased to raise revenue to pay off debt, but increasing supply is driving down prices.
Over the past 20 years the percent of ACP country trade with their traditional European partners has fallen from 7 to 3% and in 1998 LDCs accounted for only 0.38% of world trade, this level has decreased further of late as commodity prices have fallen to a 40 year low. The inability of Governments or specific sectors, to make necessary reforms, can lead to major shocks in their economic systems. At the investment level, the East Asian currency crisis, the Mexican peso problems and the collapse of the Argentinean currency are all results of global investors and speculators overheating, inflated currency markets or leaving on mass when events turn sour. In Africa, the continual decline in the prices for the commodity markets is directly linked to market liberalisation and this is having a major negative effect on countries whose economies are dependent upon export commodities such as coffee, cocao, cotton, tobacco etc… This shock treatment is unlikely to change in the near future and it is more likely that economic crises will occur more frequently as the globalisation process gains greater momentum.
Despite the lack of restraint in global market liberalisation, at this time, for most of the people, the rewards or trends are still sufficiently positive to support the process and there are several studies which statistically prove that overall poverty reductions across the world have been faster in the past 30 years than at any other time. However, conditions are not static and the speed of change is accelerating. The common analogy is to compare the process of globalisation to a high speed train. This train has left the station, it is not waiting for latecomers and it is gaining momentum.
Whilst there are many advocates of globalisation, there are also an increasing number of critics to the process. The backlash to the first round of globalisation was extreme with the rise of communism and fascism, which resulted in several wars during the 20th century. In this second round of globalisation, more players and countries are involved and the key question in relation to stability is balance? Is the balance right between winners and losers and is the rate of growth great enough, and equitable enough, for the majority of people to accept the terms and conditions and also tolerate the shocks that will lead us towards a richer, but culturally more homogenised world?
The rise in protest to the current round of globalisation has been manifest in increasingly violent demonstrations at World Trade Organisation meetings. The “Battle at Seattle”, was clearly an organised attempt by many groups of disaffected and angry people to make it clear to leaders in the International community that the headlong unfettered pursuance of liberalised global capitalism has drawbacks, that people are already feeling marginalised and that some will be prepared to make their grievance manifest through violent protest.
The arguments for and against globalisation can be extreme, depending on the position taken. Whilst advocates argue that all the current studies prove that liberalisation leads to increased economic growth and that the greater the degree of liberalisation the greater the rewards, the critics suggest that globalisation, is increasingly marginalising the poor and that least developed countries do not have the required skills or infrastructure to enter this new world order.
Two recent books provide clearly opposing views on the subject of globalisation. The award winning book by Thomas Friedman entitled “the Lexus and the Olive Tree” provides an overview of the process of globalisation, from a highly optimistic, entrepreneurial United States based perspective. Friedman makes the case that globalisation is a new world framework that we must all adjust to if we are to compete. According to Friedman, this process is not driven by any particular country or Government and therefore is not something which can be rallied against. The message is rather that Globalisation is a force for good, for democracy and growth. In order for companies, countries and governments to benefit from the process, they should wholeheartedly take on the policies that support liberalisation, that focus on competitiveness, free trade and the call of the marketplace. Those most able to develop new, dynamic governance systems that support the private sector, reduce the role of state, that attract investors will be rewarded by national growth. Avoiding these conditions will lead to economic oblivion.
In a recent book, entitled “Against Global Apartheid”, Patrick Bond argues that the IMF and World Bank, are increasing poverty and dependence in Africa. Bond suggests that the combination of policies such as (i) the repeal of exchange controls leads to massive flights of capital, (ii) reductions in subsidies pushes millions of people below the poverty line, and (iii) lowered import tariffs is causing widespread de-industrialisation. Bonds also suggests that the current push to liberalise the public sector services such as health, education and water, through fee paying systems and lower budgetary investment is effectively disconnecting services from the people who can least afford them. The results of the structural adjustment policies, which claim to solve poverty, are rather leading to increasing misery and the unnecessary deaths of millions of people.
There is both optimism and concern and for the future of globalisation. The process is real, it is currently the most powerful force for change in this decade and those who ignore the process do so at their own peril. At present there is no global regulatory system and although potentially desirable, the will is not yet sufficient to demand such an institution. The “balance” and “rate” of globalisation is an issue which will become increasingly vocalised on the world agenda and if current rates of change are to be our yardstick, there will be increasing evidence of winners and losers as the process accelerates.
Some of the least desirable aspects of globalisation that are relevant to Africa include the massive fall in terms of trade, dependence on donors through the dutch disease and the alternative of opting out of the globalisation process and being cut off. Friedman suggests there is evidence that those countries who are not making efforts to join the global marketplace are taking destiny into their own hands. Globalists will not coerce roaghe states into the process, but will have economic wall built around them to effectively obscure their existence. Zimbabwe is currently being internationally walled out and the consequences of this happening rather than systems being established to support the LDCs is a subject of concern.
The rise of the super trade blocs such as the Expanded EU and NAFTA, is also a matter of concern for those countries which are not associated and have no means of presenting themselves with a common agenda. African countries are in many respects prone to the more negative effects of these dimensions of globalisation and all efforts should be made to seek ways to avoid the possibility of these aspects becoming a reality.
Some
of the major arguments related to globalisation were discussed in the
Economist, (Sept 29th 2001), the main debates are listed in Appendix 1:-
THE IMPACT OF LIBERALISATION
ON AFRICAN AGRICULTURE
This section of the report offers an overview of the
impact on African agriculture as economic liberalisation policies associated
with Structural Adjustment Programmes and membership of the WTO were adopted.
The observations contained in this section have been distilled from reports of
many studies in this field. Some of these studies covered all developing
countries and others African countries but many of the findings are applicable
to the ten nations which are the subject of this report.
The Centre for Development Research has published (September 2000)
detailed findings of the impact of the liberalisation process on developing
countries in Africa. This work was based on a review of many other studies in
this field. The findings of these studies can be summarised as follows -
The devaluation of local currencies represented one of the most important ingredients of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). It was thought that devaluation would increase the income, measured in local currency, of farmers who exported their products. The reasoning was that, if export sales of the farmers’ products were made, say, in dollars, those dollars would equate to a larger sum of local currency than before devaluation. (In addition, devaluation would make the country’s exports more competitive in the world market as costs accrued in the local, devalued currency.)
Another SAP measure required governments to dismantle centralised, state-controlled commodity marketing boards. It was thought that the transfer of marketing activity to several companies in the private sector would allow competition in the market which would ensure higher sales prices to the farmer and lower wholesale and retail prices.
There is mixed evidence on the outcome of these measures. Some merchants failed to pass on the to the farmer the increased local currency revenue from export sales. In some areas traders failed to compete for farmers’ supplies and, instead, colluded with each other to keep farm-gate prices down. There is evidence to show that farmers are paid more quickly than under the state monopoly system, however.
Deregulation has tended to put more export business in certain commodities in the hands of, often, a very few foreign-owned companies whereas local trading companies have evolved to be less specialist.
Liberalisation has not had the effect of increasing quality generally. The old marketing boards monopolised trade and were, therefore, in a stronger position to ensure quality standards.
Typically, milling and hulling of grains and rice were undertaken by state-controlled enterprises prior to liberalisation. The reform measures increased the number of privately owned millers with a better geographical spread throughout the country. This has had the effect of lowering costs but the smaller millers are constrained by lack of capital.
Coffee and cocoa generally receive very little processing in Africa apart from drying, washing, pulping and curing. Some investment has been made in plant to roast coffee (Uganda), produce instant coffee (West Africa), and confectionery, but only for domestic outlets.
Almost all cotton is exported from Sub-Saharan African countries as lint (cotton after ginning) which is cheaper to transport than more highly processed products. By 1997 Tanzania had 27 private ginneries supported by multilateral donors. Unfortunately, these small companies sourced their raw material from a wide catchment area and purchased different cultivars indiscriminately. This resulted in a supply of mixed seed from the ginnery and a consequent poor quality cotton grown from that seed.
Large-scale canning of fruit and vegetables in Africa is carried out almost exclusively in South Africa and Kenya. Some European supermarket chains, however, are promoting local African washing, packaging, bar-coding and also sometimes, cutting and pre-cooking of fruit and vegetables. This element of processing tends to be confined to larger farms and packing-houses which can ensure better quality control. The added-value is, therefore, captured by only a few companies, usually foreign or racial minority-owned.
Most foreign investment has gone to the processing of export crops because such investment can be financed more easily from bilateral and multilateral donors and by commercial loans and the products have a more assured market.
Deregulation
and devaluation has resulted in a lowering of the use of agricultural inputs.
Prior to the implementation of liberalisation measures, many African countries
subsidised the supply of inputs in one way or another and although this policy
was often carried out inefficiently it did, at least, ensure the uptake of
these inputs by many small-scale farmers. Input supplies were regarded as an
aspect of agricultural extension but this system requires the distributing
organisation to have a monopoly of the marketing of produce in order for it to
recover costs. Under this previous system,
larger farmers received a disproportionately high share of the available
supplies in some cases.
A
variation of this policy has been tried again recently (1998/99) in Uganda
where 34 private cotton buyers received a government loan to supply inputs but
without such assistance the private sector finds it difficult to obtain credit
for supplies and to recover payment from recipients. Since the abolition of
transport-equalisation subsidies operated by several African governments the
supply of inputs to remote areas has dwindled significantly.
Some
organisations have stimulated the use of trust funds to finance input supplies.
In these arrangements a revolving fund is made available by traders, local
government and the farmers themselves. The success of these schemes is closely
linked to the quality and accountability of the fund managers. They work best
when adopted by pre-existing groups where social pressure ensures repayment.
Micro-credit
schemes have also been utilised for input supply. The cost of administrating
these schemes often renders them sub-commercial, however, and some donors apply
‘no subsidy conditionality’ to loans which restricts their use for this
purpose.
Seeds
Within
Structural Adjustment Programmes most governments decided to withdraw from the
multiplication and distribution of seeds but retained a regulatory and,
sometimes, a research role. Production and distribution of seeds has been taken
over by large, multinational seed suppliers or by consortia of multinationals
and local companies in many African countries. These new arrangements tend to
favour the most profitable areas of the market where large quantities of a
single variety of seeds can be supplied to larger farms. Seed supply has,
therefore, become more efficient at the wholesale level but not at the level of
the small-scale farm.
Supplying
seeds to small-scale farmers is fraught with difficulties. Small quantities of
different varieties are required to meet the individual farmer’s needs. This
involves complicated inventory problems, considerable transport costs and
wastage. There are few suppliers of the less profitable seed types of
non-hybrid maize, millet, pulses, sorghum, oilseeds and potatoes.
Prices
for seeds have tripled since liberalisation. There are now many more
distributors but this has made it more difficult to control quality.
In
Tanzania, Danida the Danish development agency, is supporting 100 village-based
seed production units to try to overcome these problems.
Research
and Extension
In the
years since liberalisation centralised extension and research has become
increasingly donor-dependent but overall funding has fallen and many
organisations are seriously under-funded. Most donor funding programmes are
devoted to training, technical assistance and capital investment and there is
less money available to cover operational funds for research.
Many
research and extension services have been criticised for poor management and a
lack of relevance of their work. Many are over-staffed but offering such poor
wages that staff are tempted to use their position for personal gain. There are
many instances of a poor interface between,
research, extension and the private sector i.e., needs of farmers’,
traders and processors.
In
general, there is little agreement about where the greater public interest in
these services should end and where the private-sector interest should begin.
Many services have undergone a ‘core functions analysis’ funded by the World
Bank Agricultural Services and Management Project but these have had a limited
effect. As farmers are under increasing pressure to increase marketed
production they need increasingly diverse, dynamic and appropriate technical
assistance rather than one-package-fits-all solutions.
Agricultural
Infrastructure includes airport facilities, roads, railways, ports, water,
electricity, telecommunications, and post harvest facilities.
Funding
for infrastructure provision is not seen to be the main problem. The bottleneck
most commonly identified is poor administration and the reluctance of
governments to invest in rural areas especially in maintenance and operations.
ECA does not have an elaborate railway network but those services that do exist
are poorly run and lack investment. The trucking industry has grown but the
lack of adequate rural transport systems is a major constraint on agricultural
development. Traders are often the only owners of trucks in these areas which
strengthens their market power over farmers.
It is argued by many
production specialists, that if the ECA is to compete successfully in world
agricultural markets, the establishment of a greater number of commercial farms
must be encouraged. The argument in favour of such development needs to be
balanced against the difficulties of establishing such farms and any negative
impact that a growing commercial component might have on the rest of the
agricultural sector and any disruption of rural and urban society.
Commercial farms
represent a significant component of the industry in Kenya. Such farms are able
to supply high quality products for onward processing and for export. In most
other ECA countries commercial farming is usually confined to the production of
cash crops such as sugar, cotton and tea.
Although there have been examples associated with large investments that
subsequently failed, it is argued that well run large commercial farms can
co-exist with small farmers and can provide a source of technology and ideas to
small-scale farmers. The possibility of
larger farmers working with out-growers is also attractive in that this process
provides access to a market that is generally unavailable to resource-poor
farmers and being involved in this market chain automatically requires farmers
to meet modern trading standards that sales into local market cannot support.
All inward investment
has a multiplier effect on the economy as wages earned by employees from new
enterprises are spent on domestic goods and services and local enterprises
supply inputs. In addition, new innovations in agriculture allow local people
to acquire skills that can be used to start other, similar new enterprises. According to Mellor, growth in agriculture
is particularly effective in reducing poverty as due to
its impact on the rural, non-agricultural, small-scale sector. Farmers spend a substantial portion of
incremental income on locally-produced non-farm goods and services and this
wealth sharing stimulates enterprise in other non agricultural sectors.
It has proved
difficult to attract foreign investment into small-scale food production in
Africa but increased investment in cash-crop production should have the effect
of increasing exports and benefiting the economy as a whole.
The difficulties of
providing the conditions for successful commercial farming should not be
under-estimated, however. Plant and machinery as well as agricultural chemicals
need to be imported. Land and water supplies need to be made available and, in
most cases, foreign personnel will be needed to run the farms and train local
workers.
As has been said
elsewhere in this report, such development is unlikely to occur without
significant social implications. Large, commercial farms usually require less
labour per hectare than the number of people needed to work the same area of
land using traditional, small-scale methods. Furthermore, the large tracts of
land needed are not likely to be available without denying the land to those
already working it.
In planning for this
kind of agricultural development, government and development agencies need to
accumulate the necessary evidence to enable them to accurately estimate the
benefits and disadvantages of encouraging commercial scale agriculture and to
estimate the pace at which such enterprises need to be established for optimum
results. In this work, agencies need to be able to estimate benefits in terms
of increased export revenue, multiplier effects and the strengthening of the
agricultural skills pool.
In addition, they
need to estimate the likely implications of expenditure on imports of equipment
from abroad and the likely use in domestic investment of profits and tax
revenue from the enterprise. More importantly, they need to understand the
impact on employment and the acquisition of land and water. If the trend towards
commercialisation leads to a significant acceleration in urbanisation, planning
must be made to provide jobs, services and infrastructure to meet the needs of
the displaced rural population.
Without such a
wide-ranging study it would be difficult for governments and agricultural
development agencies to arrive at a set of policy decisions which will
encourage commercial agricultural development at a rate which can be
successfully accommodated within the economy of the country without causing
serious and ultimately more expensive difficulties. The study should also
enable these agencies to develop policies which strike the right balance
between encouraging commercial farm development and encouraging collective
farming activities among traditional small-scale producers.
Since
1996 the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Co-operation (CTA) and the
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) have conducted a number
of studies on post-liberalisation changes in agricultural marketing
infrastructure.
Marketing
infrastructure includes the provision of market information, market research,
communication systems, fixed-site market places, credit and the proper
regulation of a legal framework outlawing monopolies, oligopolies, cartels and
trading collusion.
State-controlled
marketing boards prior to liberalisation monopolised the purchasing of a number
of commodities from farmers. The boards controlled prices, held stocks and
distributed the products at home and abroad.
Markets
in perishable food products, such as fruit and vegetables, were not usually
controlled by the boards. In Africa, the main consumers of agricultural goods
are farmers and their families but marketing boards were only interested in
surplus production. In addition, the boards were not involved in barter
arrangements and local sales at the village level although prices at that level
were greatly influenced by the boards’ price-setting.
Although
most marketing boards have been dismantled in the liberalisation process,
several still exist in some African countries and deal, especially, with the
most important export commodities and with strategically important food
products. Other boards have changed their function and deal, typically, with
the regulation of the market.
The
function of the dismantled marketing boards has been taken over by many layers
of private traders of different sizes and function. It was hoped that
transparent and competitive markets would rapidly evolve. In many countries,
however, traders have been slow to embrace the competitive system and collude
with each other to fix both farm-gate and retail prices. The forces of
competition manifest themselves mostly at the wholesale level.
Smaller-scale
traders face many problems including transport difficulties in the rural areas,
poor and mixed quality supplies in often small quantities, lack of credit, lack
of up-to-date market information, arbitrary road tolls, variable quantity units
and poor facilities at fixed-site market places, such as storage and drying
floors. In these conditions it is not, perhaps, surprising that significant
quantities of products are wasted and that traders collude with each other
especially in areas where farmers are thinly dispersed over wide areas.
Many
farmers are in an even more difficult position. They often have no transport,
no storage facilities, no credit and no means to discover the prevailing market
price for their goods. They are in a weak bargaining position compared with the
trader.
Farmers’
problems have been addressed in some areas by adopting collective activity
especially in raising credit, storage, transport, sorting, grading and
marketing. In this way, traditional, small-scale farms can gain economies of
scale and legal status enabling them to compete with commercial farms.
Most
successful farmers associations have received support from development agencies
in the form of management and business training, advice on the mechanisms of
democratic decision-making, the pump-priming of credit unions and, in some
cases, the provision of equipment such as computers and communication systems.
The
record of credit provision for small-scale agriculture is very poor. Farmers
often have no collateral and no experience of keeping proper records. Many of
those banks that have received funding from donors to provide small-scale
agricultural credit have misappropriated funds and have gone into liquidation
taking farmers’ savings with them. Poor, isolated, atomised farmers have
virtually no chance of obtaining credit except on usurious terms from traders.
The formation of some form of legal entity representing some farmers has
enabled them to obtain credit which can be used to hold back stocks when
traders are unwilling to pay prevailing market prices thus strengthening
farmers’ bargaining power.
The
history of the provision of market information to farmers in the
post-liberalisation period has been equally poor. It was recognised at the
early stages of the reform process that a free market in agricultural goods
could not function successfully unless all actors in the market were properly
informed about price movements and market conditions. Most African governments,
supported by donors, established market information services disseminating
information by state-owned radio broadcasts and through the printed media.
Almost all these services failed to deliver appropriate and timely market
information to ordinary farmers, traders and processors, but sometimes provided
useful information to government agencies and very large actors in the private
sector. Many donors have since withdrawn support.
The
advent of the Internet, mobile phone systems and local FM radio stations
broadcasting in the local vernacular has now made it possible to adopt new
models for locally-based, participatory, timely, demand-led and cost effective
market information services which can be linked to national, regional and
international information networks.
In early 2000, The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) published reports of case studies carried out to assess the effects of the implementation of Uruguay Round (UR, now WTO) reforms, as framed by the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), on the agricultural sectors of developing countries. The FAO pointed out that the period since the adoption of reforms may have been too short to assess the long-term impact on the economies of the countries covered by the study. However, the FAO studies arrived at the following conclusions-
* Of the 16 developing countries studied (Botswana, Brazil, Egypt, Fiji, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Thailand), none needed to reformulate their domestic policies in order to comply with the AoA. For most of them the reform process were just a continuation of earlier reforms they had adopted under structural adjustment programmes, regional agreements and unilateral reform programmes.
* The countries considered that Special and Differential Treatment measures (allowing developing countries to provide input and investment subsidies) were very useful.
* None of the countries had any difficulty living with a ‘tariff only’ regime (conversion of non-tariff barriers to tariff only barriers). But, again, most of these conversions had taken place under other reform programmes.
* The study showed that bound tariffs were high (those posted to WTO as a ceiling tariff rate), but those actually applied were much lower, usually due to commitments to international financial institutions or fear of damaging trade relations.
* Permissible import tariffs were found to be useful, however, especially when abrupt changes occurred in domestic production.
* There were very few examples of increased exports in the post-UR period, neither in volume or diversification. Some countries considered, however, that the prospects for exporting non-traditional products, especially fruit and vegetables, had improved. On these products countries were concerned about the difficulties of complying with WTO sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS).
* There were few cases of concrete technical or financial assistance to improve quality standards as promised in the SPS agreements.
* Food imports were reported to be rising rapidly in most of the case studies. Some developing countries reported surges in imports, especially of meat and dairy products with detrimental effects on competing domestic sectors. Guyana’s food and live animal imports almost doubled between 1994 and 1998. Small island states were particularly badly affected.
* One common observation was the asymmetry between the growth of food imports and the growth of agricultural exports.
* Although most countries covered by the case studies expected to receive benefits from the ‘Decision’ (on measures concerning the possible negative effects of the reform programme on least developed and net food-importing developing countries), there were no reports of any assistance being received.
* Countries were concerned with the general trend towards the concentration of farms. While this led to increased productivity and competitiveness, in the virtual absence of social safety nets, the process also marginalised small producers and added to unemployment and poverty.
* Similarly, most of the studies identified lack of export competitiveness. As examples, the rice and sugar sectors in Senegal were facing difficulties in coping with import competition despite a substantive devaluation in 1994 and Botswana suffered competition from beef imports often coming from subsidised EU exports.
* ACP Banana-exporting countries were concerned about the impact of WTO rulings on their preferential access to the EU market.
* The level of awareness among officials of the countries studied had improved as a result of participation in seminars, workshops and training activities organised by international agencies. However, more was required, notably in preparing WTO notifications and related databases, analysing sequences on both policies and the real economy, re-instumentation of policy measures, upgrading SPS standards, monitoring of developments at the WTO and analysing these, and in trade negotiations.
The
liberalisation process has benefited some aspects of the economies of
developing counties and some sectors of
agriculture. The lowering of tariff barriers by consuming countries has offered
more opportunities to exporters in developing countries. The exposure of agricultural
production to foreign competition has forced some producers to become more
efficient. The dismantling of government-controlled marketing boards has
stimulated the evolution of the private sector trading networks needed in a
modern economy. It is likely that, in the long-term, these changes will
encourage inward investment to improve the agricultural infrastructure and to
increase production of added value goods. At present, however, most developing
countries have yet to see any tangible evidence of improvement. The problems
faced by these countries can be summarised as follows:
·
Developing
countries have been encouraged to increase production for export. This has
resulted in over-production of many commodities and, consequently, a fall in
the price of those products – in many cases, to historic lows.
·
Isolated,
rural communities (which make up a significant proportion of the population of
many ACP countries) have been adversely affected by these changes. Farmers
cannot rely on guaranteed, fixed prices for their goods, extension services and
the supply of subsidised inputs have been curtailed, access to credit is very
limited, free education and health services are no longer available and farmers
find themselves in a weak bargaining position with private sector traders. In
addition, the trend towards the establishment of larger, commercial farms has
tended to marginalise traditional, small-scale farmers. This trend threatens
the integrity of cultural life in the countryside and the rural economy.
·
The
local markets in agricultural products are undermined by imports of cheaper
imports, including heavily subsidised imports from developed countries.
·
Many
countries lack the skills and resources to produce commodities with high enough
quality standards to compete in the world market (Henson et al).
·
Imports
of cheaper, processed food products has reduced the possibility of
manufacturing those products in the local market.
·
Stocks
of surplus food commodities in developing countries have fallen. This has had
the effect of reducing supplies of food-aid to net-food-importing countries,
obliging them to purchase more food imports on the open market.
All
these issues have been raised by developing counties in various forums and have
informed their policies in negotiations in bilateral and multilateral talks on
trade and development. Developing countries are, however, faced with an
additional set of problems in these negotiations as they often lack the
apparatus needed to negotiate successfully in these talks.
The trend towards a liberalised global market has brought with it the need to institute international standards in goods traded. This applies especially to food products.
Almost all agricultural products consumed in developing countries are covered by sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations. These are necessary for consumer protection and the protection of plants and animals in the importing country from disease.
These
measures have an important impact on the ability of developing countries to export
products to developed (and developing) country markets. Furthermore, with the
pressure for agricultural trade liberalisation increasing, there are concerns
that SPS measures could be used as protectionist measures.
The
quality standards demanded by developed countries are high and, for some
developing countries, difficult to achieve. And, what’s more, quality standards
get higher as the degree of processing is increased towards a fully
manufactured product produced for direct consumption.
Overcoming
the difficulties of producing goods which comply with the quality standards of
consuming countries almost certainly represents the most important challenge
for developing countries in a liberalised world. It is far more important, for
instance, than comparatively minor (and falling) barriers to trade represented
by import tariffs.
The
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement is designed to protect animal and plant
life or health arising from the spread of pests and disease and to protect
human and animal life from disease and toxins. The SPS Agreement is closely
linked to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) although they are separate
agreements. The AoA endorses the SPS Agreement by stating that ‘…the SPS
Agreement should be given effect by all members’.
Under
the Agreement -
-
importers are permitted to take measures based on scientific principles to
safeguard human, animal and plant life.
-
internationally agreed standards must be adopted which can only be made
stricter on scientific evidence.
-
measures adopted should be transparent – changes must be made known promptly
and enquiry points must be set up to provide documents and answer questions to
allow exporting countries sufficient time to adapt.
-
special and differential treatment must be afforded to developing countries who
can request a longer time to comply.
Industrialised
countries have established systems for analysing food products and controlling
sources of contamination. The systems for carrying out this work in most
developing countries are not as fully established or as rigorous. Nevertheless,
the SPS Agreement stipulates that all member countries are subject to the
conditions of the Agreement.
Developing
countries were given an additional two years (up until 1997) to comply with all
the provisions of the Agreement except those associated with transparency.
Least developed countries were permitted an additional five years (until 2000)
to comply with the Agreement in its entirety.
The
WTO’s chosen vehicle for setting safety standards on food is the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, a joint UN World Health Organisation/FAO body set up
in 1962. This body sets standards on limits of additives, chemicals and
pesticides and other contaminants. Representatives at this body include 140 UN
member countries (only 7% from Africa). Developing countries are largely absent
from committees but representatives of transnational corporations such as
Nestle, Monsanto, United Brands and Coca Cola outnumber the representatives of
many countries. Its regulations are extremely technical and complicated.
Existing codes take up 28 volumes. Its texts on fisheries run to 400 pages.
The
organisation chosen to oversee standards on animal health is the International
Office of Epizootics.
All
governments are eligible to participate in the various processes which
constitute the SPS Agreement. There is however, evidence of low participation
by developing countries in areas such as notification, adoption of
international standards and attendance at meetings.
Most
ECA countries do not have sufficient resources and expertise to meet all the
exacting standards required by customers in industrialised countries for food
products. These standards not only apply to the safety of the products but also
to its appearance, packaging and labelling of contents.
Meeting
these standards requires a long list of systems including quality control at
the farm level and in processing, laboratory facilities, access to clean inputs
such as water and packaging materials, controlled temperature storage
facilities and testing facilities and certification systems. If customers in
developing countries are not confident about the standards of any of these
facilities they are likely to demand additional testing at the port of
discharge and may reject any defective goods. This adds significant costs and
uncertainty to any transaction.
Developing
counties are entitled to special consideration from importing countries over
the time they may take to develop control systems. Assistance with the
difficulties of setting up and administering these systems is also available
from a number of international development organisations, such as the World
Bank and Commonwealth Secretariat, overseas development departments of governments
of industrialised countries and NGOs.
The
most comprehensive programme of assistance is offered by the UN Food and
Agricultural Organisation (FAO). Among the services offered by the FAO are :-
-
strengthening laboratory analysis and food inspection capabilities.
-
providing training in all aspects of food control.
-
providing advice, information and documents on a wide range of
related subjects.
-
publishing manuals on food quality control.
providing assistance in the strengthening of
administrative structures.
Although
this assistance may go a long way to help developing countries to meet their
obligations under the Agreement, many counties may still lack the necessary
resources and experienced personnel to run these systems effectively and to
fully participate in the functions of the Agreement.
Observers
have identified a direct link between global and national liberalisation
policies and the oversupply of primary products which has caused the dramatic
fall in the value of agricultural exports from developing countries
(Economist). The recent history of the coffee market serves as an illustration
of this linkage:-
The coffee
market as an illustration of the problems of over-supply
The recent history of the coffee market
has been used as an illustration of how over-supply has reduced prices of many
primary commodities produced in developing countries. In 1980 the price of
green arabica coffee beans on the New York market traded at US cents 150 per
lb. By November 2001 the price had dropped to 46 cents. Throughout this period
inflation has, of course, reduced the value of the dollar. In terms of the
value of goods that can be bought on the international market with their revenue
from coffee sales, producers now receive only about one seventh of the price
they received twenty years ago. At the same time, retail prices of products
made from coffee (roasted and instant coffee) have increased substantially over
the same period. A 200gram jar of instant coffee was retailing at £2 in a
London supermarket now costs £3.99. In London or New York a cup of coffee now
costs about $3 – the weekly income for many coffee farmers in Africa.
This phenomenon also applies to many
other primary commodities produced by developing countries – cocoa, sugar,
cotton, gold, copper, maize, spices, hard fibres, etc.
Given that these commodities represent
the bulk of exports from developing countries, it is clear that this phenomenon
must represent a major cause of poverty in these countries.
It would be wrong to suggest that all the
growing difference between raw material and retail prices has accumulated as
profit to the large multinational companies who dominate the trading and
processing of coffee, although this is certainly a factor. Most of the
difference is taken up with the increasing cost of advertising, branding,
packaging and retailing which appeals to increasingly discerning customers in
developed countries. All these components of the retail price are accrued in
the consuming countries, however.
So, what are the reasons for the fall in
the price of coffee beans? Observers have identified three main causes:-
1) Increased
production by a few coffee-producing countries. Vietnam increased
production from 4 million bags to 11 million bags between 1995 and 2000. Brazil
increased production from 15 million bags to 32 million in the same period.
2) Devaluation
of currencies by developing countries. Structural Adjustment Programmes,
encouraged by the World Bank and IMF and adopted by most developing countries
included the requirement to devalue the local currency. This measure was
designed to make exports more competitive and, therefore, boost the volume of
exports.
3) The
withdrawal of the economic clauses of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA).
In 1989 consuming countries, led by the US and UK, decided to end funding
to support the coffee price within the retention scheme of the ICO. Their
stated reasons for doing this was to prevent countries becoming dependent on
raw material production based on artificially high prices. It should be said,
however, that consuming countries have saved considerable sums of money by
having access to coffee at very low prices.
All three of these reasons could be
attributed to the adoption of internal and international market liberalisation
policies.
The intention of these policies were to
boost developing country exports but since the same inducements were given to
almost all coffee-producing countries, the net result has been chronic
over-production. The average annual supply of coffee increased by 3.6% over the
last 5 years – consumption increased by only 1.5%. Stocks doubled between 1997
and 2000 (International Coffee Organisation). The policies adopted to boost
coffee production are a clear example of the adding-up problem. More
and more is produced at a lower and lower price.
This is not to say that coffee is no
longer in such great demand. The 1.5% annual rate of growth in demand would be
thought of as extremely positive in many industries. In fact, it was calculated
some years ago by Christian Aid that the demand for coffee would not be
seriously negatively affected if the price of green coffee beans were as high
as US$5 per pound – ten times the current level. This is because the raw coffee
price is such a small component of the retail coffee price, compared with the
cost of advertising, branding, packaging, etc.
The accelerating difference between the
raw and retail price suggests an obvious strategy. Coffee- producing countries
should brand and package their own coffee and sell it directly to Western
supermarkets. Such a strategy would be easier said than done, however. Firstly,
developing countries would face the problem of accelerating tariffs. Many
processed products are protected by a high tariff wall around the main
consuming markets. With the advent of the Everything but Arms initiative and
similar initiatives by other developed countries, Least Developed Countries may
be able to attract investment to do this. Such opportunities are not available
to developing countries however.
In addition to the tariff wall problem,
developing countries would also have to compete with their own customers (in
developed countries) who are, themselves, major exporters of processed coffee
products, selling under established brands such as Nestlé and Maxwell House.
The US imports about 24.5 million bags of coffee beans each year but exports
the equivalent of 2.4 million bags half of which were in the form of roasted or
soluble coffee. The EU imported 46 million bags – and re-exported the
equivalent of 13 million (half roasted or soluble)(Association of Coffee
Producing Countries).
So what solutions to this problem have
been proposed?
In 1993 the Association of Coffee-Producing
Countries (ACPC) resurrected another retention scheme, without the assistance
of coffee-consuming countries this time. Association members were obliged to
keep 20% of their potential exports off the market. Unfortunately, the scheme
collapsed in early 2001. The ACPC has offered several reasons for the collapse
– lack of funds, failure to attract all producers as members, cheating, etc.
Mexico faced a legal challenge if it took part under its NAFTA agreement.
Other ways of addressing the problem have
been proposed. There have been several of what could be called conventional
approaches, in that they rely on the market to provide an answer.
1) Elimination of tariff escalation
(higher import duties imposed by importers on processed products) – This
measure might allow coffee bean producers to attract investment to process
coffee into a higher value product.
2) Promotion of consumption in new
markets, especially Russia and China.
3) Use of hedging techniques offered by
brokers in futures markets to reduce the risk factor between high and low
prices within a year.
4) Improving the quality of the beans.
5) Finding niche markets for coffee beans
or selling to fair trade organisations that pay up to 20% more for a tiny
percentage of world output.
None of these proposals would do anything
to address the problem of over-production or historically low prices. Some
would promote even more competition between producers.
The central problem with the coffee
market, from the producers’ point of view, is that there is simply too much
coffee production.
The orthodox economic view is that the
market should simply be allowed to determine output, consumption and price. In
fact, some multilateral agencies are encouraging even more coffee production in
some countries. The assumption is that, as the price falls, the less efficient
producers will be forced to stop production. In the case of coffee, however,
the reverse is likely to happen. Efficient coffee plantations – often owned by
large companies, might indeed find something better to do with their investment
if they cannot reduce production costs further. Most small-scale growers
(representing 80% of production), however, have no choice but to continue
coffee production however low the price falls. The cost of education and health
care are no longer heavily subsidised by many governments since Structural
Adjustment policies were adopted and farmers must earn cash from whatever they
know how to do best.
After the collapse of the Association of
Coffee Producing Countries’ retention scheme in 2001 the Chairman of the ACPC
wrote to the President of World Bank to ask for assistance in the crisis but it
was thought unlikely that the World Bank would offer a solution involving
global market management.
Stock retention schemes are innately
unstable and international coffee traders know this. Coffee cannot be stored
forever. The sentiment of the market will not be changed by another attempt at
such a strategy. Production capacity would have to be reduced as fairly as
possible. This may not be an insurmountable problem if farmers understood that
they could double their income with a 10% cut in production freeing land to
grow food. Producing countries would need financial and technical assistance
with such a task, however. They would also need to make binding agreements with
each other and to promote the full and active participation of associations of
coffee farmers.
Capacity reduction schemes are allowed
under WTO rules under Blue and Green Box provisions. In Europe, for instance,
farmers are paid by their governments to ‘set-aside’ land from production with
the objective of providing habitat for wild life and for reducing production.
Poverty is widespread among the 25
million people in the world who produce coffee. At present, many of these
people are supported by aid programmes. This help would not be necessary if
they were able to earn a living wage by producing a product for which there is
a growing demand.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS
Some of the problems faced
by African countries are perceived by many observers to be caused by the
liberalisation process, itself. For this reason African governments are making
representations in international forums to clarify, add to, modify and, in some
cases, reverse agreements made on international trade in agricultural products.
The most important of these forums is the WTO. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) is especially important as it applies to African countries’
most important exports.
[The
Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan are not yet WTO
members]
The
Agreement on Agriculture, which came into effect 1st July 1995,
covers agricultural produce but excludes fish and fish products and forest
products (e.g. timber).
The
implementation period of the AoA was six years (commencing 1st Jan
1995) for developed countries and ten years for developing countries.
The
three main objectives of the Agreement are:-
To
increase market access
To
increase export competition
To
reduce domestic support
The
assumption behind these objectives is that if protective measures, such as
subsidies, tariffs and quotas, which distort the international market for
agricultural products, are removed production will become more efficient and
producers with a competitive advantage will gain the highest market share.
In
theory, many African countries have a competitive advantage in the production
of certain agricultural products. Wages are low and a variety of soils,
topography and climatic conditions favour the production of many crops.
Competitive production, however, also requires investment, know-how and
efficient transport systems. And, except for some specialist products, only
larger production units offer the economy of scale needed to compete
successfully.
Significant
barriers to free trade will still exist even after the implementation of the
current WTO commitments. Member countries have, however, committed themselves
to a further erosion of these barriers and a new round of negotiations on the
Agricultural Agreement began in 2000.
The
Agreement commits members to convert non-tariff import restrictions (quotas,
variable levies, etc.) on agricultural produce into equivalent tariff barriers
(i.e. the new tariff would have the same effect of restricting imports as the
old non-tariff barrier). These tariffs cannot be increased.
Developed country members are committed
to -
-
reduce import tariffs over the period of the Agreement by an average 36% and a
minimum of 15% for any one imported category of product.
-
reduce outlays on export subsidies by 36%.
-
reduce the volume of subsidised exports by 21%.
-
reduce domestic farm support by 20% except for ‘green box’ measures (see
below).
-
allow
a minimum access (imports) of the equivalent of 5% of domestic consumption on
certain categories of product. This does not commit a country to actually
import these quantities but simply provide the opportunity for such quantities
to be imported.
Developing country members are committed
to –
-
reduce import tariffs over the period of the Agreement by an average 24% and a
minimum of 10% for any one imported category of product.
-
reduce outlays on export subsidies by 24%.
-
reduce the volume of subsidised exports by 14%.
-
reduce domestic farm support (AMS) by 13.3% except for ‘green box’ measures.
allow
a minimum access (imports) of 1% rising to 4% by 2004 of domestic consumption
on certain categories of product.
Least Developed Country members are committed to bind (fix)
their import tariff rates and provide minimum access quotas but are exempt from
any reduction commitments. LDCs and developing countries with a per capita
income of less than $1000 are exempted from eliminating export subsidies but
import substitution subsidies must be eliminated by 2002.
The
Agreement contains many qualifications and exceptions.
On
tariffication -
- in some circumstances countries are able to
use the Special Safeguard Provision of the Agreement. This provision is
designed to protect the products that were subject to tariffication from surges
in imports or large price falls when countries are allowed to impose additional
duties.
-
Some countries are covered by a Special Treatment Clause (often known as the
Rice Clause) covering specific commodities. This clause only applies to South
Korea, the Philippines and Japan who wished to protect the farmers of their
staple food (rice), and Israel who wished to protect certain livestock
products.
On
Domestic Support –
Domestic
support takes the form of monetary sums given by governments to farmers to
subsidise production of specific products or more general expenditure on
infrastructure, research, etc.
-
The Agreement recognises some categories of support to be
‘non-trade-distorting’ and some that are not, or minimally trade-distorting.
These
are –
‘Green box’ supports that are deemed to be minimally
trade-distorting and are not subject to reduction commitments. They cover
research, extension, food security stocks, disaster payments, anti-narcotic
incentives and structural adjustment programmes. Green box measures can be
challenged by countries who can prove injury to their own economies after the
Due Restraint Provision (known as the Peace Clause) of the Agreement lapses in
2003.
‘Blue box’ supports are a special category created
to accommodate the EU’s and US’ system of augmenting farmers income for
reducing production or only maintaining levels of production at an agreed
level. They include the EU’s ‘set aside’ programmes and US deficiency payments.
These are also not subject to reduction under the terms of the Agreement.
‘Amber box’ supports are payments made directly to
farmers for each unit of output and, as they are deemed to be trade-distorting,
they are subject to reduction.
- De
minimis clause
– This clause allows countries to maintain a certain minimum level of support
to farmers. In the case of developed countries this can be up to 5% of the
value of production for individual products and 5% of total agricultural production. For Developing countries, support
can be given up to a level amounting to 10% of the value of total agricultural
output.
- Special and differential treatment – allows developing countries
to provide input and investment subsidies.
On
Export subsidies-
Export
subsidies are payments made by governments to producers or exporters to enable
them to sell goods abroad at cheaper levels than they could otherwise afford.
When such sales of manufactured goods are made at below their cost price, it is
known as ‘dumping’ and the practice is prohibited. Agricultural products are
regularly sold abroad (almost exclusively by industrialised countries) below
cost price but it is neither described in the Agreement as dumping nor
prohibited.
The
practice is, of course, beneficial to consumers of such products but cheap,
subsidised imports compete with domestically produced products and drive prices
down for domestic producers.
EU
and US export subsidies take several forms including export credit. Both are
compatible with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture but are again subject to the
agreed reductions.
As WTO members agreed to continue the
process of support reduction beyond this period, a review of the Agreement
began in 2000.
An
overall objective of the Agreement is to provide a more ‘level playing field’
in world trade in agricultural products. It should be understood, however,
that, at this stage of the liberalisation process, industrialised countries
have an added advantage as they have traditionally provided high subsidies and
are only called upon to reduce them. (EU and US subsidise agriculture at rates
between 40% and 50% of its value). Developing countries have provided little or
no subsidies but cannot introduce them or increase them beyond the 10% de minims levels.
It
could also be said that domestic subsidies provided to farmers in
industrialised countries under ‘production-limiting programmes’ are
trade-distorting as production would not be profitable without them.
Only
25 out of 132 members of the WTO are allowed to have export subsidies. Three
exporting countries account for 93% of export subsidies on wheat, two for 80%
on beef and two for 94% of butter.
[All
ten countries, which are the subject of this report, are ACP members]
The Lomé Convention expired in February 2000 after having served as a basic framework for economic co-operation between the EU and ACP countries for two decades.
The
convention gave ACP countries preferential access to the EU market for a wide
range of goods including many agricultural products.
Of
greatest importance to ACP countries were the four Commodity Protocols attached
to the Convention covering bananas and sugar and, to a lesser extent, beef/veal
and rum. Under these protocols, ACP producers were able to sell a fixed quota
of these commodities in the EU at the same price enjoyed by EU producers. These
prices were, and are, considerably higher than world market prices.
Most other goods entered the EU under the General System of Preferences. The GSP is a trading regime which governs commercial relations between the EU and all but the most highly developed industrial countries. Under this system these countries are treated equally as far as import tariffs into the EU are concerned. Almost all tropical products and raw materials enter the EU duty-free. Most manufactured products are subject to import tariffs. Processed agricultural products, such as instant-coffee and confectionery, carry import duty rates which tend to increase according to the amount of processing involved (escalating tariffs).
On
certain other goods including some fish products, tobacco, fruit and vegetables
and cut flowers, ACP countries enjoyed increased EU access under the Lomé
Convention in the form of tariff levels that were lower than GSP rates.
Negotiations for a new agreement between the EU and ACP countries were finalised in February 2000. The new arrangement, known as the Cotonou Agreement, replaced the Lomé Convention.
The parties to the Lomé Convention were obliged to negotiate a new agreement as many of the Convention’s provisions were incompatible with WTO rules. The Cononou Agreement calls for reforms to be made over the next seven years which will bring all its trade relationships into line with WTO regulations. There is no clear agreement on how this can be accomplished but the EU has agreed that the new arrangements will give equivalent benefits enjoyed by ACP countries under the Lomé Convention.
In the meantime, no significant changes have been made to Lomé provisions for preferential import tariffs for ACP goods. In addition, since the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU has made special provisions for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) – (see Everything But Arms below).
The Lomé Protocols on sugar and beef remain but the arrangements under the banana protocol, which were anyway amended before the expiry of Lomé, have been substantially altered.
Europe still represents the most important market by far for ECA exports. All trade agreements between ECA countries and the EU are subordinate to WTO rules, however. Certain elements of existing and future trade agreements between the EU and African countries may be found, by the parties to such agreements, to be unsatisfactory for this reason. It is important to remember, therefore, that, in order to modify these unsatisfactory elements, it would first be necessary to change WTO rules.
Members
of the WTO have agreed that, in general, no member should differentiate against
another in their trade relationships. The WTO allows groups of countries to
form trading agreements with each other under certain conditions. Developed
countries are permitted to offer preferential trade conditions to Developing
Countries and to Least Developed (LDCs) and Net Food-Importing Developing
Countries (NFIDCs). In addition, members can make separate agreements with
groups of countries in a specific geographical region, such as the Southern
African Development Community, the North American Free Trade Association and
the European Union.
It
is quite clear, however, that ACP countries do not constitute a region and,
although 50 of the 71 countries are either LDCs or NFIDCs, they do not all come
within these categories. No single criteria can be used to define these
countries into a group which would satisfy WTO rules as an exception. It would
be very expensive for the EU and thus politically impossible, for instance, for
the EU to extend ACP preferences to all medium-income and poor states.
At
its Doha Ministerial meeting in November 2001, the WTO finally extended a
waiver to the EU until 2008 to find a solution to this problem.
The solution preferred by the EU is the establishment of Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (REPAs). The establishment of such agreements is fraught with difficulties, however, especially if they to confer the same benefits to ACP countries as Lomé. REPAs must be reciprocal arrangements (i.e. non-preferential to ACP the countries in the REPA vis-a-vis the EU). In addition, once the REPA is established, ‘substantially’ all trade between the partners must be duty and quota-free. The word ‘substantially’ in this context has not been fully defined. In an agreement between Australia and some Pacific states, 95% of all trade was required to be duty-free. Other agreements have excluded agricultural products. The time allowed to reach duty-free status has also been flexibly interpreted but is unlikely to be extended further than 12 years.
Discussions
on the establishment of a Free Trade Agreement between South Africa and the EU,
under this category of exceptions, took over three years. Deals between the EU
and regional groups of countries would, obviously, be more complex. The WTO
Committee on Regional Arrangements, which must approve trade agreements, is
also likely to take some time to complete the approval process.
ACP representatives have identified several other problems with REPAs.
* The combination of REPA proposals and the market access offered recently to Least Developed Countries under the ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) initiative (see below) could serve to split African countries politically and economically. In essence, Least Developed Countries now have little incentive to join a REPA with their Developing Country neighbours because the EBA already offers them full EU market access. Some Developed Countries may even apply to be reclassified as Least Developed Countries despite the loss of status involved.
* Many African countries belong to two or more existing economic communities. They may find it difficult to choose which one to join if these communities decide to apply for REPA status.
* Adjustment costs, especially in the context of continued agricultural protectionism, are likely to be high.
* ACP customs revenue could be reduced.
*
Since those designing a new regional relationship would have to face the
possible requirement that trade barriers between all members of an agreement
would have to be the same. This would not please countries with weaker
economies in a region dominated by one or more powerful economies.
Another possible solution to the problem of WTO compatibility would be the introduction of an enhanced form of Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Some observers have suggested that having a viable GSP could significantly strengthen the hand of ACP negotiators in REPA negotiations. It has also been noted, however, that GSP is non-contractual, GSP was unlikely to offer ACP countries the same level of benefits as Lomé, and the chances of being able to reform the GSP system is limited. One suggestion has been to create a sub-group of countries with improved GSP terms, although the WTO compatibility of this option has been questioned (Stevens).
Given that WTO rules on free trade areas were designed to cover agreements between partners at similar levels of development, it has been suggested that there is scope for allowing a much greater degree of flexibility in agreements between developed and developing countries.
ACP countries are also concerned about the capacity of developing countries to participate meaningfully in trade negotiations. It has been pointed out that southern African countries are involved in national, regional, bilateral and multinational talks.
One
of the ironies of the likely changes to international rules on trade is that
ACP countries, most of which are poor, will lose out in agricultural trade not
to other poor countries but mainly to rich and middle-income countries. The
USA, Canada, Australia, Israel and Turkey will be among the main beneficiaries.
The Cotonou agreement represents a compromise reached between ACP countries and the EU and it still contains elements with which ACP countries remain dissatisfied.
Continued agricultural protectionism in the EU (especially regarding temperate produce, a sector in which Southern African countries are currently competitive) represents a continuing disagreement between the parties. It has also been noted that the EU has recently expanded its support for processed agricultural exports – often assisted by export refunds for the raw material content of the final product. For example chocolate and confectionery exporters get refunds for the sugar content and can now undercut ACP producers in their own market.
In addition, ACP countries have complained that, while import tariffs into the EU have been reduced, non-tariff barriers represent a major obstacle to improved ACP exports and overall subsidies to EU farmers and exporters have not been reduced.
Most
international trade is carried on between the major blocks of industrialised
countries – Europe, North America and industrialised countries of the Far East.
Only a small proportion of this trade is in the raw materials which constitute
the bulk of products supplied by developing countries.
The
growth of trade between ACP countries and the EU has been much slower than the
growth of trade between the EU and other developing countries. Between 1988 and
1997 total exports by ACP countries to the Community grew by less than 4% in
volume, whereas those of other developing countries grew by about 75%.
The
EU is also committed to expand eastwards to include several Eastern European
countries which have proportionately large agricultural sectors. The EU, which
was in any event engaged on a programme to reduce subsidies in agriculture, is
unlikely to offer new EU countries expensive agricultural subsidies including
high, guaranteed prices to farmers. ACP produce imported into the EU within the
commodity Protocols on beef and sugar are paid for at EU domestic prices. As
these fall, so will the price paid to ACP countries for these products.
As was mentioned above, the WTO allows countries to offer preferential trading arrangements with Least Developed Countries. The EU had, for some time, promised to improve access to its market for LDCs. The EU was convinced that the economic plight of LDCs could be alleviated through increased trade. One way of stimulating trade would be for the EU to dispense with all import tariff barriers and limited quotas on all LDC products. (Clearly, trade in arms and ammunition needs to be discouraged).
Despite stiff resistance from EU agricultural interests from the moment it was proposed, the EU ‘Everything but Arms’ measure was agreed in February 2001. In effect, the EU has amended its Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) to extend duty-free access to all LDC imports but full access for bananas, rice and sugar will be phased in over the next few years.
The measure grants LDCs duty and quota-free access to the EU market from 5th March 2001 for all agricultural products including fresh and processed fruit and vegetables, maize and other cereals, starch, oils, processed sugar products, cocoa products, pasta and alcoholic beverages. Imports of three ‘sensitive’ products, bananas, rice and sugar, will not be liberalised immediately, however. These products are deemed ‘sensitive’ because beet sugar is an important European crop, certain southern European agricultural communities depend on rice-growing and the EU’s granting of preferential access to Caribbean bananas is the subject of a long-running WTO-brokered dispute with the US and Latin American suppliers.
The EU will gradually reduce import tariffs on fresh bananas to zero by cutting the tariff rate by 20% every year between 1st January 2002 and 1st January 2006.
Full liberalisation of rice imports will be phased in between 1st September 2006 and 1st September 2009 by gradually reducing the full EU tariff to zero. In the meantime, in order to provide effective market access, LDC rice can be imported duty-free within the limits of a tariff quota. The initial quantities of this quota shall be based on best LDC export levels to the EU in the recent past plus 15%. The quota will grow by 15% every year from 2517 tons, (husked rice equivalent) in 2001/2002 to 6696 tons in 2008/2009.
Full liberalisation for LDC sugar imports will be phased in between July 2006 and July 2009 by gradually reducing the full EU tariff to zero. In the meantime, LDC raw sugar can be imported duty-free within the limits of a tariff quota which will grow from 74,185 tons in 2001/2002 to 197,355 tons in 2008/2009. The quota idea was accepted because some European agricultural interests were concerned that LDC countries would import sugar cheaply from third countries in order to boost their own exports to the EU market and thus negatively affect the EU sugar industry. Sugar imported under the EU/ACP Sugar Protocol will, at present, be unaffected. The EU Commission will closely monitor the volume and origin of all these imports and review the progress of the scheme in 2005. (See below for details of the impact of EBA on sugar producing countries.)
The current EU price for rice is 100% higher than world market prices. EU sugar prices are 160% higher and EU banana prices are 83% higher.
At present LDCs, as a group, are net importers of rice and sugar but this new measure is likely to stimulate investment in the production of these commodities. The Sudan is already a small, net-exporter of sugar and is likely to benefit from this measure.
The greatest long-term benefit to LDCs is likely to come from a stimulation of investment in the production of added value products. Prior to EBA, the EU set import tariff barriers against processed agricultural products although most raw agricultural products were allowed into the EU duty-free. This form of protection, known as escalating tariffs, discouraged investment in LDCs for plant and equipment to convert raw materials into processed goods. Without this tariff barrier, however, investors are likely to realise that, with their comparatively low labour costs, LDCs would become competitive producers of these added-value goods.
It will, of course, take some time for companies to make and implement investment decisions. Quality control is of the utmost importance in the food industry and investors will need to be assured that any subsidiary food-processing companies or local contractors have the means of exercising such control. In addition, they will need to assess the political and economic stability of any new manufacturing site before investing. It is also important to remember that the largest component of costs, represented in retail prices of processed food products in the EU, are the combined costs of packaging, branding, advertising and retailing of the goods. The value of none of these components is likely to accrue to LDC suppliers at present.
Some
commentators have suggested that, through the EBA measure, the EU will have a
greater influence to persuade LDCs that they should be more favourable to EU’s
views on WTO reforms but the EBA is obviously a good step in the right
direction. But how much difference will it make to LDCs?
LDCs
represent 10% of world population but account for only 0.5% of world exports.
In 1980 their share of world exports was 0.8%. LDC imports to EU are only 1% of
total EU imports, 99% of which are already exempt from duty under Lomé
agreement or GSP. From the LDC’s point of view Europe is a much more important
as a trading partner – 50% of their exports go to Europe.
The
EBA should have the effect of increasing exports overall, increasing the share
of LDC exports with the EU and, most importantly, encouraging development of
new products in LDCs. The impact is likely to be very modest at first. LDCs
have limited capacity to produce more without further investment.
It
is also important to note that the EU has said that it will invoke a safeguard
clause if their own domestic industries are threatened by too much imported LDC
produce. At present it is difficult to measure exactly what the impact will be.
Unfortunately, this uncertainty adds insecurity for potential, long-term
investors in new production capacity in Least Developed Countries.
The
EBA is also likely to cause problems for ACP countries classified as Developing
Countries. They face more competition in the EU market from LDCs. Mauritius and
some Caribbean states are especially worried about losing access to the EU on
sugar (see below) and rice.
Another
important concession to LDCs in the EBA is their entitlement to import raw
materials from certain other countries, including the EU, and to export to the
EU, duty free, products processed from these raw materials provided at least
100% has been added to their value.
EBA
is not the final answer to LDCs export development. In fact EU trade barriers
are less important to LDCs than quality standards, economic and social
stability, better training and the installation of modern communication
systems. LDCs must also be able to convince investors that they represent a
safe and stable environment to establish factories and plant to carry out processing
work.
The impact of the EBA and EU
enlargement on ACP sugar producers
Obviously, the EU’s Everything but Arms
initiative is of greatest interest to least developed countries but it will
have an impact on all sugar-producing ACP countries. The expansion of the EU
will also be an important factor.
The central issue is the difference
between the world price for sugar and the EU price. EU farmers receive about
US$ 464 per ton (the intervention price) – the world price is currently about
US$ 200.
The EU allows 1.3 million tons of exports
of raw sugar from 19 ACP countries into Europe at the high, intervention price.
This concession was made in the Sugar Protocol linked to the Lomé Convention –
and it’s been preserved in the new Cotonou Agreement. In addition the EU allows
300,000 more tons into the EU from ACP countries (and a couple of other
developing country producers). This is Special Preference Sugar (SPS) which can
be sold in Europe at the equivalent of 85% of the EU intervention price.
Quite recently the EU passed the
‘Everything but Arms’ measure which came into force 5th March 2001.
This allows LDCs to import anything into the EU free of duty or limiting quota.
Sugar is an exception – it has been
deemed a ‘sensitive’ commodity. Full liberalisation will not be granted by the
EU immediately but will be phased in between Sept 2006 and Sept 2009. The EU
has, however, established a quota for LDC sugar to be imported, free of import
duty. This quota will rise from 74,185 tons in 2001 to 129,751tons in 2005/6 to
197,335 tons in 2008/9. There will be no limit on the quantity of sugar allowed
into the EU from LDCs thereafter. Although this sugar can be imported into the
EU duty free, it will have to compete on the EU market with domestic production
and Sugar Protocol supplies. In practice, therefore, it will have to be sold at
a discount to the full EU intervention price.
The EU made the decision to grant these
concessions in the face of stiff opposition from EU sugar producers. And the EU
is still concerned that new imports will compete with EU farmers. For this
reason, the EU will closely monitor the impact of EBA and review the situation
again in 2005. The EU is one of the highest cost sugar producers in the world
but it produces approximately 17 million tons each year of beet sugar. It also
subsidises the export of 5 million tons of sugar a year at the lower world
price by giving EU sugar producers the full intervention price and funding the
difference from its agricultural budget.
In the short term the impact of this
measure on the European sugar industry is likely to be very modest. LDCs as a
whole are net importers of sugar and even those ACP LDCs that produce a surplus
(Sudan and Zambia) have limited extra production capacity in place. The EBA allows
LDCs to import world price sugar from third countries and export their own
sugar to the EU at the very much higher price, however.
A study by ED&F Man, one of Europe’s
largest sugar trading companies, concludes that LDC s are likely to begin to
increase production and will, by 2009, be able to export considerably more than
the 300,000 tons of SPS concessions. LDCs are also likely to increase
production of white (refined) sugar rather than raw sugar.
Mozambique is likely to be one of the
main beneficiaries of the EBA measure as it has many abandoned sugar
plantations which are being brought back into production with investment from
investors from Mauritius among others. The World Bank and IMF oppose the
expansion of sugar production in Mozambique but allowed the government to go
ahead with an expansion programme when an FAO report showed that increased
sugar production could create thousands of jobs (Hanlon).
The EU’s Sugar Protocol was negotiated
separately from the Lomé Convention and is legally protected. The agreement
covering SPS sugar expires this year, however. ED&F Man are convinced that
the EU will reduce the quota of SPS sugar to accommodate EBA sugar. In other
words supplies from non-LDC ACP countries are likely to be sacrificed in favour
of supplies imported under the EBA measure.
Let us take Fiji as an example of how the
EBA may affect a sugar-producing ACP member classified as a developing country.
Fiji produced 266,000 tons of sugar in 1998 (a low figure for Fiji because of
unusual drought conditions that year). Its EU quota under the Sugar Protocol
was 165,348 tons. Its SPS quota was 23,000 tons. The loss of the SPS quota will
amount to approximately US$ 4.5 million a year.
There are three more problems facing ACP
sugar producers.
1) The EU is likely to expand to include
Poland. Poland produces 1,5 million tons of sugar a year but can only afford
export subsidies for 150,000 tons. Therefore, when Poland joins the EU, total
EU production will be substantially increased.
2) The EU intervention price is likely to
fall to comply with WTO rules.
3) If the EU has more to export – it may
dispose of it on the world market, thus lowering the world price. The price for
ACP sales outside the EU may therefore be reduced.
The EBA, however, represents an important
incentive for LDCs to increase sugar production.
The EU is not the only major importer of LDC goods to have adopted measures to increase access from LDCs. Canada, New Zealand and Norway have notified measures taken, while Japan and the US have proposed or announced new measures that will significantly improve market access for Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
On 1st September 2000, Canada added a further 570 tariff lines from LDCs for duty-free treatment. In November 2000 New Zealand announced that from July 1st 2001 it would give duty and quota-free access to all LDC imports. In the same month Norway announced its agreement to offer duty-free access to all industrial and agricultural imports from LDCs with the exception of flour, grains and feeding stuffs. In December 2000 Japan announced that it would increase duty-free status on LDC industrial products from 94 to 99 per cent which will include textiles and clothing.
Like the EU, the US allows many products, especially raw materials, from LDCs into its markets free of duty. It too has responded to the need to increase market access for African goods. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) came into force May 2000.
The bill grants duty free access for certain products from the 48 Sub-Saharan countries which were excluded from the US GSP programme bringing the number of products in the programme to 1835 tariff lines. The programme lasts for ten years to allow long-term business planning.
The bill also establishes a US – Africa Co-operation Forum and two privately financed and managed funds. The Forum will facilitate high-level discussions on trade and investment policies and will work with the private sector in the US and Africa to develop a long-term business agenda. The funds will be used to leverage private financing for small and medium-sized US and African companies and promote improved infrastructure development in Africa. One is the US$150 million Equity Fund and the other is a US$500 million infrastructure fund.
The bill will also eliminate quotas on textiles from Kenya. Textiles from African LDCs are exempt from quotas.
Enhanced trade and private-sector investment benefits will be available to all Sub-Saharan African countries but especially those that undertake sustained economic reform, maintain acceptable human rights practices and make progress towards good governance.
The US has less than 10% of the African market. One reason, according to US Senator Richard G. Lugar, for enacting the AGOA was to assist the US to compete with the EU in supplying Africa with machinery, electronics, financial services and agricultural products.
Wealthy industrialised countries are able to maintain permanent missions in Geneva for WTO negotiations, in Brussels for EU/ACP talks and in other negotiation centres. They can afford to employ experienced legal and technical staff, to access and analyse relevant information, commission research on areas of interest to them and can lobby effectively through the mass media and at the various relevant forums throughout the world.
ACP countries vary in their ability to marshal the necessary resources to negotiate effectively in trade talks. Many ACP countries are unable to maintain permanent missions in Geneva or Brussels yet are expected to participate in WTO and ACP talks as well as bilateral and regional trade negotiations.
The ACP Secretariat groups member countries into six regions – Eastern, Western, Central and Southern Africa and Caribbean and Pacific countries. The EU ambassadors of member countries form the Committee of Ambassadors and these ambassadors are the negotiators at EU/ACP negotiations. Some Ambassadors are supported by their own technical staff within their embassies. Most countries have to rely on the technical staff of their various ministries in their capital cities for detailed advice. Further advice and support is offered by the ACP Secretariat. Each of the six regions have formed committees and these are supported by a Bureau responsible for co-ordinating their work, accessing information and offering legal support. The totality of African ACP countries rarely meet or co-operate in formulating Africa-wide negotiating positions partly because of the differences in economic profile between African countries.
The ACP Secretariat, in turn, receives assistance from the Commonwealth. This takes the form of a technical aid package which includes training and funding research studies and will soon include the services of a full-time consultant on trade issues.
Developing countries receive assistance from many agencies to strengthen their capacity to negotiate at WTO talks. Despite all this help, there is a tremendous imbalance between the resources available to developing countries and those available to industrialised countries. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, for instance, have only two professional staff in their missions in Geneva while Hong Kong has ten and the USA up to 250. The Africa Group of WTO representatives meet for an hour each week in Geneva but in general, the group has not developed a coherent common negotiating position or made alliances to pool their resources.
These countries miss many activities and negotiations undertaken within the many bodies of the WTO. One developing country official commented that their participation within the WTO is minimal in that they often have to accept whatever is decided by others. A country can only protect its interests if it knows what its interests are and how these can be accommodated within the negotiation agenda.
It should be pointed out, however, that many African countries maintain embassies in many countries and some of their Geneva representatives are concerned that their governments do not give activities in Geneva proper priority.
The word market has several meanings. It can be used to describe business or trade in a particular commodity. It can mean the fixed site where buying and selling take place and it can also describe the set of activities involved in buying or selling. This section examines further this last definition in the context of ECA countries.
Marketing activity can range from a barter transaction between farmers, where each swaps one commodity for another, to the informal, micro-entrepreneurial activity of a roadside retailer, to medium-scale bargaining in a major town assembly market, right through to the functions of the huge futures markets in London and New York. In most markets for commodities the potential buyer has the opportunity to examine the goods on sale before deciding to buy them. This need not be the case if both parties to the transaction know the precise specification of the goods. In most markets too, except usually in retail shops, a transaction only takes place after the buyer and seller haggle to arrive at an agreed price and sales conditions. Often, the details of the final transaction are not known, except to the buyer and seller.
In larger markets the price arrived at between buyer and seller is often made public and this information helps to set the price for other transactions for that particular commodity. Such markets are said to be transparent. Markets where buyers have easy access to more than one competing seller, and sellers have access to more than one competing buyer, can be described as competitive markets.
Competition in markets is encouraged because it forces traders to cut costs and profits and to increase the volume, and hence increase the efficiency, of their trading activity. This should have the effect of keeping prices to customers low. Some of these customers might be processors and so, the overall effect of competition keeps retail prices down, increases the competitiveness of the country and matches supply with demand at a particular price.
With the obvious exception of large markets like the Kenya Agricultural Commodity Exchange and some tea auctions, most markets in ECA are neither perfectly transparent nor perfectly competitive. But this is true of most markets in the world. Traders are within their legal rights in most markets to keep secret the details of their business from competitors and their other suppliers or customers. It is common practice in this region, however, for traders to collude with each other to pay low prices to suppliers and charge high prices to consumers. Although such practice is outlawed, it is very difficult and expensive for the authorities to enforce regulations. In many isolated places there is only enough trading business to provide a living for a single trader.
Many traders in Africa have little experience of competitive markets. They are unwilling to put fellow traders out of business by raising their purchase price for supplies or cutting prices to customers. They know that if they do this they are likely to expand their business and that with a greater volume of trade they could increase their profits even though they would earn less profit on each transaction. They fear, however, that other traders might adopt the same strategy and put them out of business. This is, of course, what happens in a competitive market but as non-efficient small traders are replaced by efficient larger traders, the overall efficiency of the market increases and allows the market to grow and increase trading activity.
Agricultural commodities are traded in ECA in several ways. Very large commercial farms and plantations, typically growing tea, sugar and cotton, often have their own long-term, direct contractual arrangements with one or more buyer. They may also make sales at formal auctions or on futures markets. (For information on the role and function of futures markets, see Annex 1).
Most agricultural products are consumed by farmers, themselves. At the village level farmers may barter one product of which they have a surplus for a product which another farmer has produced as a surplus. Surpluses which are not disposed of in this way are brought, usually in tiny quantities, by bicycle or draught animal to the village market where they might be sold by local, small-scale retailers. Any quantities surplus to the village needs are likely to be sold to itinerant traders whose activities might cover several village markets. These traders typically own or hire small vehicles and sell the produce to a larger sedentary trader in nearest assembly market. Assembly markets have the function of ‘bulking up’ small parcels of produce into full truck-loads of a similar product which can then be sold in markets sited in major cities or for export. Traders in assembly markets may also sort, grade and accurately weigh the produce and repack it into standard weight bags. At each level in this marketing chain a proportion of the commodities are likely to be processed into higher value goods or sold for retail. In addition, these fixed site markets also act as retail outlets for farm inputs, tools and consumer goods.
Market site ownership and management may be controlled by local government or by private companies. They are likely to be responsible for collecting market fees from stall-holders, market porters, sedentary traders and those bringing in and taking out produce from the market. Fee rates may be fixed or levied according to the quantity of produce bought or sold. They are also likely to be responsible for cleaning the market, providing and repairing market stalls and buildings and for regulating trade.
Although these fixed markets account for the purchase and sale of most surplus agricultural goods, a proportion of produce may be sold directly or through small itinerant traders to roadside markets. Travellers on the road can purchase these goods for their own use but some traders with access to vehicles may purchase goods from these markets for forward sale in assembly markets.
Another proportion of surplus goods may be purchased from farmers by local store-owners who, again, are likely to bulk-up supplies from several farmers before selling to a trader.
In addition to these forms of market activity, some very large traders, specialising usually in a small range of commodities, often hire or employ agents who tour the country in lorries at appropriate harvest times to purchase supplies from village markets.
At the wholesale end of these markets the largest traders, who may be locally or foreign owned, can prepare the product for export or repackage it for large-scale retail outlets.
In Africa only the wholesale end of these forms of market activity is likely to be very competitive or transparent. Traders often collude with each other to fix their purchase and retail prices for a particular commodity in a particular location for a fixed period of time. They will change these fixed prices from time to time according to market conditions, however. In some countries all transactions are in cash as credit is expensive and hard to come by. Some credit may be advanced by traders to farmers but often at usurious interest rates. Farmers are reluctant to part with goods without payment at the point of sale. Very little use is made of written contracts except for the largest deals.
There are many formal commodity exchanges in the world. They are simply places where buyers and sellers meet to formally trade contracts representing parcels of commodities where samples of the produce are available for inspection. A tea auction could be described as a commodity exchange and several other commodity exchanges deal in a single commodity. The commodity exchanges in Kenya and South Africa trade in a range of grains.
Commodity exchanges can only function in certain market conditions and, with some exceptions, few of these conditions exist in ECA countries. These conditions may change over time, however, and more exchanges might be established.
Almost all commodity exchanges have been established by private sector initiatives. This usually happens when the number of buyers and sellers grows too large to for one-to-one transactions to be quickly and efficiently executed. If, for instance, there are 100 sellers of maize and 100 buyers of maize all wishing to do business at the same time it would take a great deal of time and cost for each party to meet to exchange offers and bids for maize and to use the offer of those buying and selling commitments with other potential contracting parties to drive a better bargain.
In the normal model of a commodity exchange, buyers and sellers give their buying and selling orders to a limited number of brokers who aggregate the buying and selling orders and execute them in bargaining sessions with brokers acting for other clients. The price at which these transactions are executed becomes a benchmark price for that particular commodity at that particular time. Trading volume has to be sufficiently large to provide enough commission to brokers to enable them to earn a living and pay for the administration of the exchange.
The quality, quantity, location and delivery time of the commodity in question has to be precisely defined for the benchmark price to mean anything.
Apart from coffee and sugar, whose international prices are determined outside the country, ECA countries produce surpluses of only very few commodities significantly large enough to justify the establishment of a commodities exchange to trade them. Kenya is exceptional in that it has a significant production from large commercial farms and has established the Kenya Agricultural Commodity Exchange.
It should be noted that without strict regulation, commodity markets are prone to manipulation, tax evasion schemes, inside trading and wild speculation by people who cannot afford the losses they make. Quality control is also an essential precondition to formal trading systems of this kind. Very few actors in the ECA agricultural sector have access to the sophisticated testing equipment necessary to specify the exact quality of any agricultural product.
Most farming in ECA takes place in very small units. Seeds, farming methods, packing and storing differ from farm to farm. The quality of every commodity produced can vary very widely with hardly any two batches being the same. Even if quality control could be established well enough to ensure that all parcels of a commodity traded under a specific contract were of the same specification, it is unlikely that these standards would be recognised internationally without further costly testing by the recognised independent companies in this field.
The authority of a commodities exchange depends also on the integrity of documents of title. The security of the warehouse in which the commodity is stored and proof of ownership imply a need for a high degree of legal and banking control and efficiency.
In the developed world, and in certain other countries where modern farming methods are used, large farming units together with standardised farming techniques and mechanical farming methods ensures the production of huge quantities of a homogeneous products that is best marketed through a formal exchange. Few of these conditions apply in ECA.
Most
Sub-Saharan African countries implemented SAPs by the mid 1990s. Developing and
Least Developed WTO-member countries will have completed the implementation of
their commitments to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture by the end of 2004.
Although
the adoption of these measures has strengthened certain elements of the market
infrastructure in ECA countries, many studies have shown that some sectors of
the agricultural industry and a significant segment of the population have been
adversely affected by
the liberalisation process.
According to Engberg-Pedersen et al, - in a long-term analysis of economic trends in sub-Saharan Africa, it was found that adjustment situations had made little positive difference to growth or poverty alleviation. Using statistics collected by the FAO, growth rates in 37 adjusting African countries were not significantly different in the adjustment years of 1986-93 than they had been in the previous seven-year period. Of the sampled countries, 24 % had better growth rates, 22% had the same rate of growth and 52% had worse rates.
In some African countries liberalisation
has not led, either, to the hoped-for stimulation of industrial development. In
Ghana access to capacity was used up after the government adopted more
liberalised policies and the exposure to foreign competition led to a
deceleration in growth from + 5.6% in 1988 to 2.6% in 1991 to only 1.1% in
1992. Employment in manufacturing fell from 78,000 in 1987 to 28,000 in 1993
(Lall – 1994)
The
central issue now, therefore, for ECA countries is how they might take
advantage of the opportunities that have been offered by more liberalised
markets, while, at the same time, devising strategies to combat the negative
effects of the process.
Various
options have been proposed.
Some
strategies, quite clearly, can only be considered by global institutions such
as the World Bank, IMF and the WTO. It is of vital importance, therefore, for
developing countries to make their voice heard at these forums and to develop
clear and practical policies, singly and in groups, which have the maximum
chance of being adopted by these institutions.
The
task of designing strategies to support the agricultural sectors of ECA
countries has to be addressed at many levels and by many different public and
private-sector agencies. In many African countries government agencies
responsible for agriculture, finance, transport, industry and trade have been
co-ordinating efforts to provide an environment which will allow the
agricultural sector to become more productive and efficient. The most important
task for government has been to establish a legal framework to encourage
investment and competitive trading activity in agricultural goods. Agricultural
development and research agencies have focused, in recent years, on the need to
increase production and productivity in the sector. More needs to be done in
these areas, especially for food products. Land reform and measures to provide
access to water and proper regulation of trading activity are needed
desperately in many countries.
These
type of measures are designed to allow market forces to work to their optimum extent
to encourage competitive sources of supply, to keep costs down, to attract
investment, to stimulate exports and maximise production of goods that the
country can produce competitively.
Important
as these measures are, they are unlikely, in the short or medium term, to
address the negative aspects of globalisation nor to provide the level of
support for agriculture needed to significantly improve the welfare of the
majority of actors in the agricultural sector.
The
negative aspects of liberalisation have now been clearly identified. If these
are to be tacked directly, it has become obvious, that some new strategies are
required. These strategies have been referred to as the ‘post-adjustment
agenda’ (Friis-Hansen).
Some
consensus among developing countries and development analysts on the way
forward has begun to emerge. It was recognised even before the establishment of
the WTO that developing countries needed to be treated differently from
developed countries in so far as their commitment to reduction of input and
investment subsidies. This concept is incorporated in the WTO ruling on ‘Special
and differential Treatment’ which also allowed developing countries more time
to comply with WTO rules and to be assisted with technical advice and food
supplies in times of high international prices caused by reduced farm support.
The
international community had, in essence, decided that market forces alone, at
least in the short-term, could not solve the problem of the lack of development
of agriculture in developing countries. Some form of intervention in the market
process would be needed.
This
does not mean that there will be any move to re-establish state-owned
industries or marketing boards to control the distribution of goods. But any
post-adjustment agenda is likely to extend the scope of intervention to
overcome the negative aspects of globalisation with the ultimate objective of
preparing countries to take up a competitive position in world markets. But
where and what type of intervention is needed? How can such intervention be
linked to improving not only the competitiveness of agriculture but also ensure
that benefits are enjoyed by all actors in the sector? Which agencies should be
used to make these decisions and which should implement agreed strategies? Many
policy-makers have proposed that this issue must be the concern of every agency
in agriculture if new strategies are to be successful.
Not
surprisingly perhaps, many developing countries have been making concerted
representations to the WTO in an effort to change international rules which
effect their agricultural sectors.
121
proposals have been made to the WTO Committee on Agriculture in the current
sessions of discussion.
Most proposals submitted by developing countries make radical proposals for change. In particular, they have proposed that special and differential treatment should be enhanced and that special safeguard measures in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) should continue to protect developing countries from surges in imports. They submit that WTO reform should not be based on a ‘one-size-fits-all-approach’ and that due consideration must be given to the heterogeneity and diversity of country situations in order to ensure sufficient flexibility and room for manoeuvre to address non-trade concerns in all WTO member countries. Developing countries should be allowed more support for their own agricultural markets, should be granted more market access and should receive more technical assistance.
A proposal submitted to the WTO by a group of countries, (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and El Salvador), sums up many of the ideas put forward by other developing countries.
This proposal links the concepts of food security and national security and also calls for the strengthening of special and differential treatment for developing countries. The proposal calls for key products, especially food staples, to be exempt from liberalisation. It says that the domestic production capacity of developing countries must be encouraged and helped to become more competitive, rather than destroyed on the basis on non-competitiveness. It points out that national security issues are exempt from WTO trade disciplines and that food security is inextricably linked to national security. Countries in dire need and dependent on other countries for something as basic as food are politically weakened. In the past, it says, food has been used to gain a political and economic stranglehold over a country.
The proposal goes on to suggest that AoA rules seem to bestow special and differential treatment on developed rather than developing countries. Overall subsidies have increased rather than decreased in OECD countries. While special and differential subsidies allowed to developing countries are limited to only input and investment subsidies, developed countries have recourse to the Blue Box (measures such as ‘set-aside’ and other payments to farmers for reducing or maintaining production) and the very broad and vaguely defined Green Box categories of subsidy.
The proposal also calls for an end to the ‘dumping’ of subsidised products on developing country markets. In addition, the proposal complains that there has been no political will to activate the Marrakech Decision (the decision to compensate net food-importing developing countries for increased costs of food imports caused by the reform process).
The proposal introduces to the WTO the very interesting idea of the Development Box. Several groups of exemptions to agricultural support and protection measures used mainly by developed countries are grouped together in the Blue, Amber and Green boxes. This proposal suggests that measures designed to assist developing countries should also be grouped together in a development box. These would include measures to -
- protect and enhance domestic food production capacity, especially for staples.
- increase food security and food accessibility, especially for the poorest.
- provide or, at least, sustain existing employment for the rural poor.
- protect farmers which are already producing an adequate supply of key agricultural products from the onslaught of cheap imports.
- offer the necessary flexibility to provide supports to farmers, especially in terms of increasing their production capacity and competitiveness.
- stop the dumping of cheap, subsidised imports on developing countries.
The idea, if taken up by the WTO, would replace and strengthen existing elements of the AoA which are, at present, scattered over several different clauses of the agreement and in other linked agreements such as various international food aid provisions and the Marrakech ‘decision’.
Despite
the very many differences between Least Developed Countries (LDCs) they were
able to come together to agree a common front towards the November 2001 WTO
Ministerial Conference in Doha.
Trade
ministers from 49 Least Developed Countries met in Zanzibar, Tanzania 22nd
to 24th July 2001. In a statement the LDCs expressed their
determination to ‘reverse the marginalisation of our countries in international
trade and enhance LDC’s effective participation in the multilateral trading
system’. The countries agreed on a Draft Development Agenda containing
negotiating objectives and proposals of LDCs for use in Doha.
In
their Development Agenda, Ministers reiterated that the promotion of
development should form the core business of the multilateral trading system.
The fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, they said, should further make
significant movement on addressing implementation issues, confirmation of the
principles of special and differential treatment (for developing countries) and
trade policy flexibility to accommodate the interests of LDCs and a commitment
to ensuring an inclusive and transparent negotiating process before, during and
after the Doha Conference. LDC Ministers also took the view that the scope of
future multilateral trade negotiations will have to take into account the
inability of LDCs to participate effectively in negotiations on a broad agenda
and implement new obligations due to the well-known limited capacity of LDCs.
These sentiments have been translated into a set of proposals which were
persued by LDCs at the Doha meeting. These proposals include :-
LDCs
overall capacity to respond to the opportunities offered by the trading system
should be improved by, for example, providing duty-free market access on an
autonomous basis to LDC products.
Commitment
should be given to provide a contractual status to duty-free and quota-free
preferences through negotiation of a new legal instrument to make market access
secure, stable and predictable. Any temporary withdrawal of duty-free treatment
should be disciplined in a contractual manner.
Duty-free
treatment should be provided to all products.
Existing
special and differential treatment provisions should be improved in an
effective manner with a view to ensuring that duty-free access is not nullified
by non-tariff measures.
Bound
duty-free and quota-free market access should be immediately implemented for
all primary, semi-processed and processed LDC agricultural products.
The
decision on measures concerning the possible negative effects of the reform
process on LDCs and Net-Food Importing Countries should be implemented in a
full and effective manner.
(This proposal refers to the special
ministerial decision signed at Marrakech in April 1994.
Signatories promised to help those
countries ‘concerned by any rise in the world price and consequent increased
expenditure on food imports which may result from the implementation of the
Agreement’. Aid may take the form of food aid and/or aid to the development of
agriculture. In the short-term the International Monetary Fund or the World
Bank may provide financial assistance to ‘ensure normal levels of commercial
imports of basic foodstuffs’. Unfortunately, the wording of the Marrakech
Decision is rather vague and no specific measures to assist food-deficit
countries were included.).
Technical
assistance should be provided to LDCs for their implementation of these Agreements
with a view to responding to the special problems faced by them. Such technical
assistance could include, among other things – building-up capacities in the
fields of accreditation, standards, metrology (weights and measures) and certification.
The
effective participation of LDCs in the international and regional
standards-setting bodies should be accorded priority and adequate technical
assistance and financial resources should be provided. (The WTO has received complaints that its standards-setting role is
influenced too greatly by multinational corporations).
Article
15.2 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture should be maintained so as to ensure
that LDCs shall not be required to undertake reduction commitments on domestic
support, export competition policies and market access throughout the
agricultural reform process.
Steps
should be taken towards immediate abolition of export subsidies for
agricultural products, which are of particular export interest to LDCs, within
the special sessions of the Committee on Agriculture, before the review of the
Second Phase in March 2002. (This
proposal would go someway to address the problem of exported products,
subsidised mainly by developed countries, being dumped on LDC markets).
A
consultative group within relevant WTO Committees should be established which
would receive requests from LDCs for technical and financial assistance in
areas of SPS and TBT and identify possible donors.
A
fast-track dispute-settlement mechanism should be established for cases
involving LDCs.
An
interagency revolving fund should be set up, comprising of existing and new
financing facilities, as appropriate, to facilitate adequate financing on
concessional terms for LDCs and NFIDCs in times of high world market prices. It
should also provide technical and financial assistance to improve these
countries’ productivity and infrastructure, in addition to the regular
bilateral and multilateral activities of donors in this area.
Trade
and production-distorting domestic support measures in developed countries
should be substantially and progressively reduced during the course of the
reform process.
Negotiating
capacities of LDCs should be strengthened.
Technical
assistance for the implementation of multilateral trade agreements should be
increased in order for LDCs to exercise their rights under the Agreements and
exploit trading opportunities.
Technical
and capacity-building programmes for LDCs should be provided in order to address
the supply-side constraints including information and communication technology
for them to take advantage of trade opportunities identified through the
mainstreaming process.
Technical
assistance should also be provided to increase participation and negotiating
capacity of LDCs in regional trade arrangements as a step to better participate
in multilateral trade negotiations and achieve coherent negotiating objectives.
LDCs
are of the view that, under no circumstances, should environmental
considerations be used for protectionist purposes against LDC products.
All
LDC debts should be cancelled.
Unlike
the WTO’s previous Ministerial meeting in Seattle, the Doha meeting ended with
an agreed declaration of intention for a future programme.
On
agriculture, the declaration confirmed the commitment of member countries to
substantial improvements in market access, the reduction and eventual phasing
out of export subsidies and reductions in trade-distorting farm support. The
strengthening of Special and Differential Treatment for developing countries
will be given special priority and will include food security and rural
development and ‘non-trade’ concerns will be taken into account. Modalities for
further commitments, including provisions for special and differential
treatment, will be established no later than 31st March 2003.
As is
often the case, the wording of the declaration is rather vague and no specific
new measures have been agreed. Developing countries have taken some comfort
from the short period allowed for further advances in provisions for special
and differential treatment, however.
The
challenges faced by the agricultural sectors of developing countries in
adjusting to changes in international trading rules have to be recognised at
the international level but much needs to be done to develop and implement a
post adjustment agenda at the national and regional level.
Most
farming in ECA countries is carried out by small-scale farmers using
traditional agricultural techniques. It would be socially, economically and
politically impossible, in the short-term, to impose a modern, commercial
farming regime on these countries. The social cohesion of rural communities
compensates, to some extent, for the lack of a government-funded social
safetynet for the poorest members of the community. There are no other
industries in these countries that could offer employment on the scale needed
to employ redundant agricultural workers and the amount of investment available
for agricultural development is very limited.
It has
now been recognised by most agricultural development agencies (HTS Development)
that the objectives for new development
policies should be to assist traditional farmers to adequately feed themselves
and, if they are able to produce a surplus, to help them to produce higher
quality, higher value products. Every effort should be made to ensure that farmers
receive a greater share of the retail price for their goods.
Small-scale
production, by definition, cannot achieve the economies of scale required to
compete with the mechanised, large-scale, production methods used in competing
countries. (Dutch onions are now sold in Senegal and South African potatoes in
Uganda.) Economies of scale could be improved, however, if farmers joined each
other in collective activity. This might include sorting, grading, storage and
packing of a homogeneous product, the acquisition of vehicles for transport,
the establishment of credit unions and the collective marketing of their
produce.
If
traditional farmers are to improve the quality and value of their surplus
production, they must have access to information about the markets for these
products and must receive the necessary and appropriate assistance to learn how
to produce them.
These
objectives were reflected in the views expressed by farmers in a workshop
recently held by UNCTAD in Kenya. The workshop recommendations included:-
·
Encouraging
the formation of producers’ associations.
·
Increasing
support for access to market information.
·
Increasing
stakeholders’ influence on research and development programmes (such as variety
research) of state research institutes.
·
Implementing
group export schemes to reduce dependence on middlemen and to increase farmers’
share of export price and make use of collateral guarantee schemes to raise
credit.
·
Increasing
access to information on supply and demand patterns.
Farmers’
co-operatives and associations are common and popular in many parts of the
world including Europe and Latin America. The historical experience of
co-operativisation in many African countries (including collective farms in
Ethiopia) has not been positive, however. There is ample evidence of
co-operative management being weak and even corrupt especially where
co-operativisation has been imposed on farmer groups. Although the benefits of
collective activity are obvious, the historical legacy of negative experience
with co-operatives has made many farmers wary of adopting this option. There
are, however, many successful examples of co-operation among African farmers.
These tend to be among farmers involved in specific crop sectors (tomato
growers in Ghana, for instance) and in pre-existing groups bound together by
kinship, religion, language, etc. where the group, itself, has proposed
collective activity.
Some
African governments have seen the merit of encouraging collective activity
among farmers. They have allowed farmers to establish legally recognised groups
which enables them to access credit more easily. Some NGOs specialise in
assisting farmers to find ways of working together. This assistance may take
the form of advice on forming democratic, decision-making structures, offering
training on marketing skills, bookkeeping and financial control and providing
them with computers and telecommunication systems.
Such
assistance enables small-scale farmers to ‘bulk-up’ their surplus production
and purchase their inputs in bulk. They are better able to improve the quality
of their produce and to transport them to larger markets where better prices
are offered. Access to credit allows them to purchase draught animals and
storage facilities. Such collective activity could put small-scale traders out
of business but one farmers’ association in Southern Uganda decided to employ
local traders to help them negotiate with larger traders (IITA).
Land
reform is a crucial component in the effort to encourage farmers to work
together. Commercial farms are able to borrow money using their land ownership
as collateral. If small-scale farmers could do the same it would bring
much-needed investment to the countryside. Collective activity might well lead
to some groups of farmers amalgamating contiguous farms to put them on a more
commercial basis. Land reform policy needs to allow for this eventuality.
International
donors recognised the need to inform all actors in African agricultural sectors
about market conditions as these markets were liberalised. They provided the
necessary resources for governments to set up centralised market information
services (MIS). Over the last decade most donors have withdrawn assistance for
MIS, however, as they became over-bureaucratic and failed to meet the needs of
their intended beneficiaries, especially typical, small-scale producers.
This
means that most farmers are unaware of prices and other market conditions even
in their nearest town which puts them in an impossibly vulnerable bargaining
position with traders who are able to take advantage of their ignorance. The
lack of market information has the effect of draining resources out of rural
areas where most poor people live. It also means that farmers are unaware of
the types and quality of produce being sought by national, regional and
international customers which hinders the entire nation in its efforts to earn
more from exports.
The
advent in recent years of mobile telephone systems and local FM radio stations
now offers the opportunity to establish locally based MIS which can disseminate
appropriate market information in the local language.
The
markets for much of the produce of small-scale farmers are influenced only by
local conditions. The markets for some of their surplus goods are dependent on
market conditions throughout the country, region or the entire world. For this
reason, locally-based MIS need to be linked to MIS services used by
larger-scale farmers and traders and to world market information sources.
African
farmers have depended heavily on agricultural research to obtain access to
better yielding varieties and varieties of drought and disease-resistant crops.
There have been, however, numerous examples of agricultural research
organisations encouraging the use of inappropriate products and techniques.
Farmers need assistance to find products which they can grow with their limited
access to tools and pesticides, etc. They must not be encouraged to grow
products for which there is a limited market or where there are no traders who
have experience of market for those products.
Agricultural
research and development organisations must
link their programmes to the market environment within which their clients must
operate. They need to undertake an analysis of the farmers' needs and
abilities. Assistance to subsistence farmers must be offered with the objective
of helping the farmers to feed themselves and their families. Assistance
programmes for farmers with a marketable surplus must be informed by a detailed
analysis of local market conditions. These organisations need to assess
existing and potential demand for the range and quality of commodities that can
be produced. They need to accurately estimate the resources required to assist
farmers to produce new products and compare the cost of such assistance with
the benefits that farmers might receive from the sale of those products. In
addition, these agencies nned to play their part in assessing the benefits and
disadvantages of encouraging farmers to act together effectively to improve
economies of scale and the quality of their products.
Technical
assistance to farmers will still be vitally necessary but no programme of
assistance should be undertaken without an accurate assessment of whether there
is an adequate and continued demand for the quality and quantity of products
that result from the programme. If a research or development programme results
in production of a particular commodity which has no local demand, efforts
should be made, prior to the implementation of the programme, to assess the
need for adequate transport, storage and financing to enable the commodity to
be marketed successfully in a more distant market. In addition, the
organisation needs to inform itself of details of programmes of any other
agencies working in the area in order to avoid duplication of effort or a
negative market impact caused by the combination of programmes.
In
order to do this work these organisations will need to develop or acquire new
skills in order to adapt to a market oriented agricultural environment. If they
are to ensure that their work is positively received by farmers and to
adequately reflect farmers’ needs, they must offer farmers the opportunity to
participate in the choice of criteria for research and development and in the
implementation of assistance programmes.
The lives of many African farmers could be transformed if they had adequate access to credit. The commercial banking sector in Africa is no longer willing to extend credit facilities to anyone other than the very largest actors in the agricultural sector. The repayment of unsecured loans by small-scale farmers cannot be assured.